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Past research has devoted lots of attention to exploring board functions, board 
composition, and board structures. However, our current knowledge on director 
mobility, including director selection and director exit, remains limited. Boards are 
consisting of individual directors. Without sufficient knowledge, companies may have a 
difficult time to establish and maintain efficient boards. 
In the first essay, I take a firm perspective to examine how network structural 
factors affect director selection. I argued that firms tend to select individuals who occupy 
superior network positions as directors. I then examine how the network structural 
positions of the recruiting firm may affect the proposed relationship. I find that firms 
prefer directors who occupy a brokerage position, which can bring more new and 
diversified knowledge into the firm. Further, the director's central position shows a 
strong network embeddedness effect to prevent directors from moving.  
In my second essay, I focus on the effect of network structural positions on 
director exit. I take an individual perspective to argue that directors serve on boards to 
obtain social capital. Therefore, directors who occupy advantageous network positions 
are more likely to exit from their current companies because those directors can better 
detect other companies which can enable them to accumulate social capital better. 
Further, I examined the contingency effect of their current firms' network structural 
position. Results suggest that directors who occupy a brokerage position to get 




occupy a central position experience strong network embeddedness effect and thus 
become less likely to exit. 
In my third essay, I adopted the stochastic actor-oriented models to explore at a 
network dyadic level, how recruiting firms and directors form appointment ties after the 
directors’ exit from their current companies. I argued that directors tend to establish ties 
with recruiting companies which can help them reconstitute lost social capital, or gain 
new social capital. The number of existing indirect ties between individual directors and 
the recruiting companies and director gender are examined as two contingencies. The 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
There is broad agreement among researchers that a board acts as a major 
mechanism of corporate governance and can affect corporate strategy and other 
significant corporate-level outcomes (Oehmichen, Schrapp, & Wolff, 2017; Rowley, 
Shipilov, & Greve, 2017; Wasserman, 2017; Withers & Fitza, 2017). Given the 
importance of boards, corporate governance scholars devote much attention to boards  
issues such as building a better understanding of board function, board composition and 
structure, and board power dynamics (Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2016; Cuypers, Ertug, 
Reuer, & Bensaou, 2017; Dalton & Dalton, 2011; Harvey, Currall, & Hammer, 2017; 
Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009; Krause, Semadeni, & Cannella, 2013; Withers & 
Fitza, 2017). The idea behind these studies is that by better understanding the role of 
boards, including the impacts of board function, board composition, board structure and 
board power dynamics, companies can better establish or adjust their boards according 
to their own situation (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton & Dalton, 
2011; Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007). However, our current knowledge on director 
successions, including director selection and director exit, is insufficient. Without 
sufficient knowledge, researchers and companies may have a difficult time forming a 
solid conclusion about how to obtain new board directors and how to retain those 
directors. Given that director succession remains a significant but understudied area, this 
dissertation will explore the antecedents of director selection and director exit, 




a director goes after an exit from the previous company to the next to provide a deeper 
understanding of director succession. 
The past research has established that social network factors, including social 
capital and reputation, social relationships and network ties can affect director 
succession (for a recent review, see Withers, Hillman, & Cannella, 2012b). Specifically, 
director selection can be affected by a director’s social capital and network ties with 
certain individuals or organizations (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Callahan, 
Millar, & Schulman, 2003; Deutsch & Ross, 2003; Seidel & Westphal, 2004; Westphal 
& Stern, 2006; Zhu & Chen, 2015b). Although director exit has not been directly linked 
to network factors, the research has shown that director exit may be affected by social 
reputation, which is also a type of social capital (Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 
2006; Harrison, Boivie, Sharp, & Gentry, in press; Jiang, Cannella, Xia, & Semadeni, 
2017b; Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Withers, Corley, & Hillman, 2012a). In addition, 
personal considerations and biases are believed to affect director exit (Boivie, Graffin, & 
Pollock, 2012; Withers et al., 2012a). Building on the past research, this dissertation 
employs a structural network perspective to explore the antecedents of director mobility, 
including director selection, director exit, and director movements (Burt, 1980b; 
Mizruchi & Bunting, 1981). Given that social network structures can be largely related 
to social capital, social ties and relationships and that individuals seek to expand their 
network and establish an advantageous network position, it is highly relevant and 
important to directly examine how social network structure can affect both selection and 




& Li, 2008; Shipilov, Rowley, & Aharonson, 2006; Tan, Zhang, & Wang, 2015). Going 
beyond the current director succession research, this dissertation explores the impacts of 
network structure at the director level. By understanding how a director’s interlock 
network can affect his or her succession, this study can provide suggestions for both 
companies and directors. 
This dissertation consists of three studies. The first study examines how the 
director-level interlock network structure affects director selection, the second study 
examines how director-level network structure affects director exit, and the third study 
examines at a bipartite network level where a director moves after an exit. 
1.1. Introduction for study 1 
How companies select directors remains one of the most important questions in 
corporate governance. The board of directors is a major governance mechanism to 
monitor CEOs and provide resources and advice to the company; thus, it has significant 
influence on corporate operations (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Desai, 2016; Howard, 
Steensma, Lyles, & Dhanaraj, 2016; Johnson & Greening, 1999; Krause, Withers, & 
Semadeni, 2016; Westphal, 1999). However, the current understanding of director 
selection is insufficient. Specifically, our knowledge about the antecedents of director 
selection is relatively limited (for a review, see Withers et al., 2012b). However, a 
significant amount of research has explored the influence of board composition and 
leadership structure (for reviews, see Daily, Dalton, & Cannella Jr, 2003; Dalton et al., 
1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Withers et al., 2012b) showing the 




composition literature, some studies suggest that directors are selected because of certain 
network considerations. For instance, Westphal and colleagues show that directors may 
be selected because of their social ties and socially oriented behaviors towards CEOs and 
other decision makers (Stern & Westphal, 2010; Westphal & Milton, 2000; Westphal & 
Shani, 2016; Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1996). Specifically, director candidates’ previous work experience and 
demographic characteristics can serve as social ties to make them more likely to be 
selected by certain boards while less likely to obtain board seats from some other boards 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). In addition, Zhu and Westphal 
(2014) show that social ties with current CEOs and directors, and social ties with people 
similar to the current CEO, may increase individuals’ chances of being selected as 
directors. Similarly, Kim and Cannella (2008b) show that directors’ social capital, 
measured as the total number of social connections within and outside the focal firm, 
affects the directors’ chance obtaining additional appointments. The above research 
suggests that companies may want to have people with certain network attributes as 
directors. However, the current director selection literature mainly considers the 
relational perspective of networks, and it has largely ignored the structural attributes of 
networks (Stern & Westphal, 2010; Westphal & Milton, 2000; Westphal & Shani, 2016; 
Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). 
Given that network structural characteristics are shown to have significant effects on 
other key individual and organizational-level outcomes (Ahuja, 2000; Ahuja, Polidoro, 




Sosa, 2011), studying director selection from a network structure perspective may help 
both companies and researchers to better understand the director selection process and 
provide more accurate and generalizable conclusions. Therefore, the main purpose of 
this study is to explore the network structure characteristics that can affect director 
selection. 
In addition, the majority of the previous research on director selection has been 
based on predicting whether a specific group of people are more likely to be selected or 
to leave by having certain types of ties, while largely ignoring the within-group 
heterogeneity for each director. For example, a group of individuals with similar 
functional backgrounds to the current CEO and directors may be more likely to be 
selected as new directors (e.g. Westphal & Zajac, 1995); however, the literature has 
ignored the fact that two individuals with the same functional background may differ. 
For example, one female and one male can have a similar educational level and 
insider/outsider status; however, they may behave very differently, and thus their 
likelihood of being selected may also be very different. To address this individual-level 
heterogeneity issue, this study examines director selection with regard to the interlock 
network at the individual level. However, given that social network theory has assumed 
structural equivalence (Burt, 1987; Walker, 1985; Zaheer, Gözübüyük, & Milanov, 
2010), meaning that network theory assumes individuals who occupy similar network 
structural positions to be commensurate with one another, this study further explores 
how the personal characteristics of each director may affect the relationship between 




how gender as an important individual-level attribute may affect the relationship 
between network structure and director selection.  
Similarly, when addressing the importance of individuals’ social perspective on 
director selection, some of the past research has also ignored the impacts of firm-level 
heterogeneity on selection outcomes, which is another limitation of our understanding of 
director selection (e.g. Zhu & Westphal, 2014). Therefore, this study also aims at 
exploring the contingent effects of firm-level characteristics. Specifically, I examine the 
contingency effect of the financial performance of the director candidate’s home 
company. Firm financial performance is widely adopted as a major metric to evaluate 
CEO and board performance (Fich, 2005; Harrison et al., In press). The recruiting firm is 
very likely to check the performance of its director candidates’ home company before 
making its final selection decision. 
This study makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the director 
selection literature. Currently, our knowledge about director selection remains very 
limited. Within those limited studies, a majority explore how network relationships, 
including social connection and social psychological consideration, may affect selection 
outcome. Building on such existing knowledge, this study explores how another aspect 
of social networks, i.e., network structures, may affect director selection (Stern & 
Westphal, 2010; Westphal & Milton, 2000; Westphal & Shani, 2016; Westphal & Stern, 
2006, 2007; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zajac & Westphal, 1996). Going beyond the 
existing director selection literature, this study examines how superior network 




individual level may affect that focal director’s possibility of being selected by recruiting 
companies.  
Second, this study contributes to the board literature and general corporate 
governance research by taking a structural network perspective. By integrating social 
network theory with agency theory, resource dependence theory, and an information 
processing perspective, this study aims to document how network structural 
characteristics might affect director selection. Whereas other studies have either 
examined the effect of firm-level network characteristics in firm-level output (Grigoriou 
& Rothaermel, 2017; Paruchuri & Awate, 2017; Shipilov, Godart, & Clement, 2017) or 
the effect of other general social characteristics in director selection (Kim & Cannella, 
2008c; Withers et al., 2012b; Zhu & Chen, 2015b), this study bridges those two streams 
of literature to propose that occupying superior network positions, such as having higher 
centrality or being a network broker, can have positive effects on director selection. In 
addition, this study explores the contingency role of gender and firm performance and 
suggests that being female and coming from a well-performing company may make an 
individual more attractive to recruiting firms. Further, this study moves beyond the 
current focus in the board literature on the impact of board composition, leadership 
structure, and interlocking ties, to show that network and network structural position can 
act as antecedents to drive the director selection process. 
Third, this study contributes to social network theory by applying it in a 
corporate governance context. Different from the previous network-context studies, 




employee network to predict employee- or team-level outcomes (Howard, Withers, & 
Tihanyi, 2017; Li et al., In press), this study considers the social network at the 
individual director level to predict director selection. Directors are individuals who are 
involved in higher-level managing activities, and thus their networks are perceived to 
have higher status, more social capital considerations and a higher level of power 
dynamics (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Shani & Westphal, 2016; Westphal, 1998; 
Westphal & Stern, 2007), which may make their network significantly different from 
both the corporate network and the general employee network. In addition, going beyond 
the current network studies, which usually focus on innovative outcomes (Fleming, 
Ming, & Chen, 2007; Grigoriou & Rothaermel, 2017; Li et al., in press; Mazzola, 
Perrone, & Kamuriwo, 2016; Patel, Fernhaber, McDougall-Covin, & van der Have, 
2014; Sosa, 2011; Uzzi & Spiro, 2005), this study explores how network structures can 
affect tie formation (i.e., director selection). By applying social network theory in this 
relatively new context with regard to the new outcomes, this study expands the 
application range of social network theory. In addition, this study examines the 
interaction effect of individual- and firm-level characteristics to explore the 
heterogeneity of network nodes. Given that two structural equivalent nodes may have 
different individual- and corporate-level characteristics, this study expands the structural 
equivalence condition of conventional social network theory by providing empirical 
evidence about the contingency impacts of individual-level and firm-level heterogeneity 





1.2. Introduction for study 2 
Why do directors leave their current boards? Director exit is beginning to receive 
more research attention (Boivie et al., 2012; Harrison et al., in press). As a major 
corporate governance mechanism, the board of directors is believed to monitor CEOs to 
reduce agency costs and to gain resources to reduce firm external uncertainties (Fama, 
1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983a, b; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Johnson et al., 1996; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Given the importance of their boards of 
directors, corporations may want to keep valuable directors to maintain their human 
capital. Therefore, sufficient knowledge on the antecedents of director exit becomes 
critical so that companies can develop effective policies to retain their current directors.  
The current director exit studies mainly focus on how significant negative events 
such as bankruptcies or financial restatement affect director exit (Arthaud-Day et al., 
2006; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Withers et al., 2012a). However, 
director exit can also occur during non-crisis periods (Boivie et al., 2012). A notable 
limitation in this stream of research is that the other drivers of director exit in a non-
crisis period are ignored. Only one recent study attempts to address the issue whereby a 
director may exit from a board when the directorship fails to meet his or her personal 
benefit requirements (Boivie et al., 2012). Building on this study, I explore  other 
potential antecedents of director exit from a social network perspective. Specifically, I 
examine how each director’s network position may affect his or her likelihood of exiting 




Both scholars and practitioners have long argued that directors stay on boards to 
expand their social network and gain social capital, which may help them to achieve 
future career success (Boivie, Graffin, Oliver, & Withers, 2016b; Lorsch, 2012; Lorsch 
& MacIver, 1989; Westphal & Stern, 2007). As a result, directors may be motivated to 
stay on multiple boards and thereby explore new board opportunities (Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989). However, the board research has also suggested that directors suffer 
from personal information processing barriers such as time, cognitive, and capability 
constraints (Boivie et al., 2016a; Khanna et al., 2014). These personal constraints, 
together with the increasing complexity associated with board roles, may prevent 
directors from staying on too many boards (Lorsch, 2012). In addition, evidence in 
finance research has shown that firms with busy boards, those in which a majority of 
outside directors hold three or more directorships, are associated with weak corporate 
governance (Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). In fact, facing these competing situations, 
directors may have to change their current directorship portfolio to maximize their social 
capital gain. Specifically, I argue that directors may exit from certain boards to focus on 
others or replace certain current directorships with new board opportunities.  
However, not every director is able to and wants to make an exit decision. I argue 
that only directors with greater access to board relevant information and relatively higher 
power compared to other directors are able to effectively identify and obtain other board 
opportunities and thus make the decision to exit from certain current boards. Social 
network theory suggests that network nodes can obtain information and power benefits 




Burt, 2007b; Burt et al., 2000; Freeman, 1977; Ibarra, 1993; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; 
Mahmood et al., 2011). Applying this network structural argument to director exit, I 
argue that directors occupying superior network positions have greater access to board 
relevant information and relatively higher power compared to other directors, and they 
are thus more likely to exit from an existing board to pursue other, better opportunities. 
Specifically, this study provides fresh insight to argue that directors who occupy 
brokerage or central positions in an interlock network may become more likely to exit 
from their current boards. 
Social network theory also suffers from its own limitations. Network structure 
arguments were originally developed to explain egocentric networks (Burt, 1979, 1980b, 
1992; Granovetter, 1973). Although it has been applied to global networks, network 
structure arguments fail to address the non-structure heterogeneity of each network node 
(Burt, 1978). In other words, two directors who occupy the same structural position are 
believed to enjoy the same network benefits and thus may have similar outcomes. Such 
structural equivalence assumptions ignore the heterogeneity among individual directors 
and the heterogeneity of their current companies (Burt, 1987; Hanneman & Riddle, 
2005; Mizruchi, 1993; Walker, 1985; Zaheer et al., 2010). The corporate governance 
research has widely established the fact that both individual attributes and company 
characteristics can significantly affect director-level outcome (Withers et al., 2012b). To 
overcome this limitation, I further explore the moderating effect of director gender at the 
individual level and current firm performance at the director-company level to add some 




less likely to make an exit decision compared with their male colleagues even when they 
have occupied either central or brokerage positions. In addition, directors are less likely 
to exit from firms that have excellent performance even when the directors have 
occupied either central or brokerage positions.  
This study makes three major contributions. First, it contributes to the director 
exit literature by introducing social network theory to the director exit research. Going 
beyond the focus of the current director exit research, which mainly addresses the 
positive impacts of negative events on director exit at the firm-level, this study, as one of 
very few studies, explores how individual attributes may affect director exit in non-crisis 
periods (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Boivie et al., 2012; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Harrison et 
al., in press; Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Withers et al., 2012a). Specifically, this study is 
the first to examine how directors’ individual-level network positions may affect their 
decision to exit from current boards. Further, this study explores how gender as an 
individual-level contingency and firm performance as a firm-level contingency may 
affect directors’ exit decision when occupying central or brokerage positions. Together, 
these findings offer more complete knowledge of director exit by adding individual- and 
firm-level heterogeneity into the network structure arguments. 
Second, this study joins the debate addressing whether director exits are mainly 
involuntary (Boivie et al., 2012; Srinivasan, 2005). A large stream of the existing 
research has assumed that most director exits are involuntary and thus occur concurrent 
with negative events (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Marcel & 




voluntary or based on mutual consent (Boivie et al., 2012; Harrison et al., In press; 
Withers, Corley, & Hillman, 2013). Contributing to the second stream of research, this 
study argues that director exits can be not only voluntary but also tools adopted by 
informative directors (i.e., directors who occupy brokerage or central positions) to 
manage their directorship portfolio and increase their potential gain of social capital 
during non-crisis periods. Providing new evidence to support the notion that director 
exits are mainly voluntary, this study also opens up more opportunities for theorizing 
and examining how directors may leverage their exit as an effective approach to 
achieving personal benefits. In addition, this study provides indications for companies 
that may want to retain their current directors. By leveraging my conclusions, companies 
may be able to develop better human resource management policies. 
Third, this study expands social network theory by applying social network 
theory in a corporate governance context. Different from the previous network context, 
which leverages a firm-level network to explore firm-level outcomes, this study 
examines how director-level network attributes can affect the director-level outcome 
(Ahuja, 2000; El-Khatib et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2018; Martin et al., 2015; Reinecke & 
Ansari, 2015). The board of directors is at the top of a firm’s governance hierarchy. 
Therefore, the director network can be characterized as an elite context (Burt, 1979; 
Mariolis, 1975). In addition, director-level output is relatively distinct from typical firm-
level network output such as performance and innovation (Ahuja, 2000; Ahuja & Carley, 
1999; Fleming et al., 2007; Yayavaram & Ahuja, 2008; Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Instead, at 




development (Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007). This makes my setting different from 
other firm and general individual-level network settings. By applying social network 
theory in this context, this study expands the application range of social network theory 
and provides new insights into potential network outcomes. Further, this dissertation 
examines the interaction effect of individual- and firm-level characteristics and thus adds 
node-level heterogeneity to network arguments. 
1.3. Introduction for Study 3 
How do directors move on their job market? What are directors’ potential career 
paths? These questions remain unanswered in the field of corporate governance. 
However, without an understanding of director mobility, companies can hardly develop 
effective policies to attract and retain valuable directors, and thus they may suffer from 
difficulties in maintaining board effectiveness. To address this important gap, this study 
is designed to explore director mobility. The current research on director mobility has 
addressed either the selection side or the exit side.  
The existing director selection research has mainly shown that directors with 
certain valuable attributes, such as higher social capital, special expertise and being a 
minority, are more likely to be selected by companies (Cashman et al., 2013; Keys & Li, 
2005; Kim & Cannella, 2008c). In terms of director exit, a majority of the existing 
research has emphasized that a significant negative event, including financial 
restatement, negative media coverage or organizational failure, can lead to director exit 
(Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Harrison et al., in press; Marcel & 




selection and director exit, it is be reasonable to note that both streams of research suffer 
from some negligence. First, the current research on director selection has mainly taken 
the employer’s perspective (Westphal & Stern, 2006; Zhu & Chen, 2015b). Although 
companies do have greater power in director selection compared to directors, director 
selection is still a double-sided selection process. Individual directors also have their 
own considerations and may enjoy some freedoms to select companies when accepting 
board offers. Therefore, switching the focus to individual directors may provide some 
fresh and valuable knowledge. Second, a majority of the current director exit studies has 
ignored the fact that director exit can occur in a non-crisis period (Boivie et al., 2012). A 
director may want to leave when he or she must overcome certain constraints, e.g., 
limited time and capabilities, or to save time and attention to better pursue other 
opportunities (Boivie et al., 2016a; Boivie et al., 2012). More importantly, there is no 
known link between director selection and director exit that offers both scholars and 
practitioners a complete picture about how directors make decisions. To address all of 
the above gaps, this study explores how directors make decisions by identifying the 
types of company to which directors may move when they have exited from prior 
boards. 
It is widely believed that directors are motivated to serve on boards because it 
can expand their network, increase their social capital, and help them achieve future 
career success (Boivie et al., 2016b; Lorsch, 2012; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Westphal 
& Stern, 2007). Without other constraints, directors may be motivated to serve on 




constraints, such as time, cognitive capacity, and capabilities together with the 
increasing complexity associated with board roles prevent them from staying on too 
many boards simultaneously (Boivie et al., 2016a; Boivie et al., 2012; Lorsch, 2012). 
Integrating both arguments, this paper theorize that directors may strategically arrange 
their directorship portfolio so that they can maximize their gain of social capital with 
limited time and capabilities. Specifically, directors who have exited from prior boards 
may want to move to companies that allow them to reconstitute ties with members on 
their prior boards and enable them to gain new social capital. 
Different individuals may also have their own way of making decisions, 
especially when different contingencies are applied (Boivie et al., 2012; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). To provide a more realistic understanding 
of director mobility, this study also explores two contingencies to add network and 
individual heterogeneity at the individual level into the director mobility framework. 
Specifically, this study argues that when a focal director has multiple ties to directors 
from his or her prior board, he or she is less likely to reconstitute another tie with 
directors from that prior board, whereas he or she is more likely to accept an offer from a 
board consisting of more new network contacts. Further, when a director is female, she 
is more likely to reconstitute a tie with directors from her prior board, whereas she is less 
likely to join a board whose directors are all fresh to her network. 
To test my conceptual framework, I adopted simulation investigation for 
empirical network analysis (SINEA) to better account for the network dependency and 




particular social network analysis specifically allows me to construct both a director-
level interlock network and a director-company bipartite network, and thus enables me 
to explore the detailed dynamics of director mobility while simultaneously modeling 
individual-level heterogeneities to largely overcome the structural equivalence problem 
in traditional network analysis and measures. By adopting this new approach, this study 
is able to provide more accurate and complete knowledge on director mobility. 
This study makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the director 
selection research by taking a director’s perspective to study selection. Going beyond the 
current director selection studies, which mainly focus on how companies and boards 
select directors (Withers et al., 2012b), this study, as one of the very few studies that 
does so, explores how individual directors select their next board after exiting from prior 
boards. This switch of view enables us to explore a different understanding of the 
director selection process and thus provides a more complete understanding of director 
selection. 
Second, this study contributes to the director exit literature by introducing 
another possibility of voluntary director exit (Boivie et al., 2012; Srinivasan, 2005). A 
large stream of the existing research has assumed that most director exits occur as a 
response to negative events (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Marcel & 
Cowen, 2014). By exploring the next possible directorship after a director exit, this study 
shows that director exits can also be a tool adopted by directors to maximize the gain of 




personal constraints. As a result, this study introduces the idea that director exit can be 
adopted as an effective tool and thus shed light on future director selection research. 
Third, this study contributes to the director mobility and director labor market 
literatures by exploring where directors move when they exit from prior boards. As one 
of the pioneer studies to integrate director exit and director selection to explore the 
moving path of individual directors, this study discloses how directors’ intention to 
retain and increase social capital can affect their mobility in the director labor market. 
Further, this study examines the contingency effect of existing ties between focal 
directors and other directors based on their prior board and gender. Together, these 
findings offer informative new insights into director mobility.  
Fourth, this study makes a significant empirical contribution by adopting 
RSIENA to test the conceptual framework. Compared with conventional analysis, 
RSIENA enables a further exploration of dyadic-level heterogeneity (Kim et al., 2016). 
Therefore, this study is able to examine director mobility at the individual level to 
predict new tie formation. In other words, this study is able to examine whether a 
specific individual is more likely to move to another specific company. By adopting this 
analysis, this study provides a more solid micro-foundation of the proposed framework, 




2. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Given the significant role of boards in corporate governance, management 
scholars have paid a great deal attention in studying the functions of boards (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Building upon 
an agency perspective, boards of directors are believed to serve as a critical control 
mechanism to monitor the actions of executives on behalf of shareholders (Fama, 1980; 
Fama & Jensen, 1983a, b). Along this stream of research, studies focus on the structure 
of boards to suggest that the appointment of independent directors and the separation of 
the board chair and CEO positions will help managers make better decisions and thus 
increase firm performance (for a review, see Withers et al., 2012b). Although the current 
empirical evidence fails to fully support this argument (Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton et al., 
1999; Ellstrand, Daily, Johnson, & Dalton, 1999), this monitoring perspective is still of 
crucial importance in the corporate governance literature, and it has been taken for 
granted by practitioners (Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016a). 
With the exception of the agency perspective, the resource dependence 
perspective was introduced into governance literature to understand some of the non-
monitoring functions of boards (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Resource dependence theory 
is a broad theory that identifies how managers seek to reduce environmental uncertainty 
and dependence through multiple approaches; corporate governance scholars usually 
focus on the resource provision role of boards to suggest that by having directors who 
have access to or are linked to critical resource providers, companies can better manage 




Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The research has shown that linking to key resources through 
interlocking directors can increase firm capability to adapt to and manage external 
uncertainties (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). For example, by having ex-politicians on a board, companies can 
reduce uncertainty and gain access to information, legitimacy, and/or resources 
(Hillman, 2005). Companies suffering from a compromised reputation may obtain a 
buffering effect by having minority directors (Hafsi & Turgut, 2013). Firms also aim to 
form interlock ties as a means to manage their knowledge dependence (Howard et al., 
2017). Given the importance of crucial resources, companies are also more likely to 
reconstitute broken ties with the partners on which they depend (Westphal, Boivie, & 
Chng, 2006). 
To integrate with the resource dependence perspective, Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003) present the concept of board capital to suggest that directors can provide both 
human capital and social capital to enhance their monitoring and resource provision 
roles. Human capital is defined as an individual’s skills, knowledge, expertise, and 
experiences (Becker, 1964; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hogan & McPheters, 1980; 
Schultz, 1961), whereas social capital is defined as “the sum of actual and potential 
resources embedded within, available through, and derived from, the network of 
relationships possessed by that individual” (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998: 243). The research has shown that board human capital can affect CEO 
selection, firm growth, CEO power, and firm competitive advantages (Haynes & 




al., 2013; Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011). Similarly, board social capital can 
have salient impacts on significant company outcomes, including inventor decision 
making, firm performance, and director interactions within the boardroom (Brown, 
Anderson, Salas, & Ward, 2017; Sauerwald, Lin, & Peng, 2016; Westphal, 1999).  
However, boards of directors cannot offer effective resource and monitoring to 
companies at no cost. At the firm level, finance and accounting scholars have shown that 
busy boards, which are boards with majority of outside directors who hold multiple 
directorships, can lead to weak corporate governance and lower performance (Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006). Taking a board/director perspective, a recent information process 
perspective views boards as a mechanism to process information for the company 
(Boivie et al., 2016a; Khanna et al., 2014). This view suggests that boards may 
encounter a series of information process barriers, such as director cognitive bias and 
individual time constraints, which affect their capability to process information and thus 
become ineffective in monitoring and resource provision (Boivie et al., 2016a). This 
argument suggests that firms must carefully select directors to obtain boards that can 
perform well in both monitoring and resource provision. For individuals, this perspective 
suggests that, given that individual directors may suffer from personal information 
processing barriers such as time and capability constraints, they may only be able to sit 
on a limited number of boards (Boivie et al., 2016a). As a result, directors must carefully 
design their directorship portfolio to maximize their opportunities to improve their 




Social network theory has suggested that networks can affect the accumulation of 
social capital (Coleman, 1988, 1990), information and knowledge (Granovetter, 1973, 
1985; Powell, 1990)(Granovetter. 1973,1985; Powell, 1990), and intellectual human 
capital (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). The social 
network research has two main focuses. The first stream of network research focuses on 
the network relational perspective to study actors and the relationships that connect or 
divide them (Benson, 1975; Burt, 1980a; Ebadi & Utterback, 1984; Lincoln & Miller, 
1979). Typical research topics include the antecedents and outcomes of network ties, 
such as the characteristics and strength of relational ties (Granovetter, 1973) and 
relational embeddedness (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). At an organizational level, the 
empirical research has shown that having network ties can enable imitation and practice 
diffusion (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild, 1993; Haunschild & Miner, 
1997). In addition, tie strength can increase adaptation and learning by mitigating 
uncertainty (Hansen, 1999; Kraatz, 1998). Further, relational embeddedness is shown to 
influence organizational outcomes such as alliance formation and performance, firm 
financial performance, and knowledge transfer (Gulati, 1998; Ingram & Roberts, 2000; 
Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002). At the individual level, the research has found that CEO 
candidates who have relational ties with the current CEO are more likely to be appointed 
as the future CEO (Wiersema, Nishimura, & Suzuki, 2018). Tie strength is shown to 
affect how individuals process non-redundant knowledge (Perry-Smith, 2014). Similar to 
its effect at the organizational level, relational embeddedness can also affect bank 




The second stream of network studies focuses on the structure of networks to 
consider the impacts of network structures and patterns. In particular, the structural 
perspective has studied how an actor’s advantageous network structural position can 
help that actor to obtain important information, status, and resources (Brass, 
Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Kilduff & Brass, 2010). Advantageous positions, 
including central positions, brokerage positions, and a moderate level of network 
clusters, are believed to be associated with better access to resources and information, 
higher status and power, which can provide focal actors better opportunities to develop a 
variety of capabilities (Brass, 1992; Brass & Burkhardt, 1992; Burt, 1980b, 1992; 
Freeman, 1977). In accordance with this stream of work, the empirical findings at both 
the organizational and individual levels have shown that network centralities are 
associated with better innovative capability development (Ibarra, 1993; Ibarra & 
Andrews, 1993; Mahmood, Zhu, & Zajac, 2011). Brokerage is another important 
network position (Burt, 1992; Freeman, 1977). Brokers can bridge other non-connected 
network actors and can thus allow the broker actor to obtain more diversified and non-
redundant information (Burt, 1992, 1997; Freeman, 1977; Hanneman & Riddle, 2005; 
Reagans & McEvily, 2003). At the organizational level, a brokerage position has been 
shown to have a significant influence on innovation and organizational alliance behavior 
(Ahuja, 2000; Jiang, Xia, Cannella, & Xiao, 2018; Reinecke & Ansari, 2015). At the 
individual level, a brokerage position can also affect the focal actor’s creativity and 




As the relationship perspective has emphasized the importance of ties and 
relationships with the surrounding nodes, conceptually, it can address the heterogeneity 
of the relationships among different sets of actors (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996). 
However, the structural perspective focuses on patterns instead of specific ties, and it 
thus suffers from the so-called the structural equivalence problem (Burt, 1987; Mizruchi, 
1993). Structural equivalence is a fundamental assumption of the structural perspective 
that treats different network actors and relationships with similar network structures as 
homogenous (Kilduff & Brass, 2010). For example, two nodes with the same network 
structure, e.g., the same level of centrality, are understood to have a similar effect on 
outcomes of interest. To overcome the structural equivalence problem and to address 
actor and relational heterogeneity when studying a network structure, some of the recent 
research has adopted advanced methods such as exponential random graph models 
(ERGMs) and simulation investigation for empirical network analysis (SIENA) to model 
the dyadic and node-level network structure of individual nodes (Howard et al., 2017; 
Kim, Howard, Cox Pahnke, & Boeker, 2016). 
2.1. Theory and Hypothesis for Study 1 
2.1.1. Director selection 
The above discussion on board function makes a clear point that companies are 
motivated to select directors who can better realize their monitoring and resource 
provision role, and who suffer from fewer information processing barriers. However, the 
question of how to locate and select such directors remains. Although much work has 




the studies do not explore how network structure can affect the selection outcome at an 
individual director level (Withers et al., 2012b).  
Some of the existing director selection studies take a firm perspective to explore 
how certain characteristics of individual directors are preferred by selecting companies. 
For example, the research has shown that after a takeover, professional independent 
directors (i.e., independent directors who have multiple board seats) are three times more 
likely to be appointed than other directors (Keys & Li, 2005) because professional 
independent directors have higher general human capital, which can help them better 
process relevant information and provide advice to their firms. In addition, directors who 
have more connections are valued in the marketplace (Cashman, Gillan, & Whitby, 
2013; Kim & Cannella, 2008b) because firms believe that widely connected directors 
can better realize their resource provision role. Further, a firm may want to have certain 
types of directors to gain legitimacy. For example, Gregorič, Oxelheim, Randøy, and 
Thomsen (2017) found that the social pressure on firms with regard to gender equality 
positively affects their appointment of female directors. Similarly, firms have also been 
found to engage in impression and reputation management by appointing minority 
directors and independent directors (Westphal & Graebner, 2010).  
Other director selection studies take an individual perspective to explore how 
socio-political factors may affect the director selection process. For example, Westphal 
and colleagues showed that social factors, including interpersonal interaction and sharing 
a similar functional background with directors with higher status and having a similar 




lead to an individual additional board appointment (Westphal & Shani, 2016; Westphal 
& Stern, 2006, 2007; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zhu & Westphal, 2014). Similarly, Zhu 
and Chen (2015b) suggested that narcissistic CEOs may be involved in the director 
selection and are more likely to choose directors who also have a narcissistic tendency or 
have prior experience with other similarly narcissistic CEOs. 
Both streams of the director selection research play an important role in exploring 
the director selection process. However, given the complexity of the director selection 
process, our knowledge about director selection is limited. With the aim of providing a 
better understanding of director selection, this study mainly takes a firm perspective. I 
believe that although director selection is a two-way selection process, firms are usually 
the party with relatively higher power. Thus, although it may not be the firm’s first 
choice, the final selection outcome must be a result recognized by the firm. Therefore, 
by taking a firm perspective, this study can better explore the structure of a director-level 
network that can make an individual more attractive to recruiting firms. 
2.1.2. Social network theory and board of directors 
From the literature review on the director selection literature, it is very interesting 
to note that both streams on director selection have addressed the fact that social network 
factors, including directors’ overall social connections and certain types of ties to a 
particular person or organization, may affect whether an individual director will obtain 
an additional board appointment. Social network theory by nature serves as an effective 
framework with which to address selection problems because people view someone 




similarity, and in-group or in-network members are usually more visible (Burris, 2005). 
Empirically, both firms and individuals have been shown to prefer selecting similar or 
familiar others with whom to either work or to imitate. For example, at the 
organizational level, Mizruchi (1989) has shown that firms with similarities in terms of 
industry, the geographical proximity of headquarter locations, market constraints, and 
common relationships with financial institutions exhibit common political behavior. 
Gulati and Westphal (1999) have found that interlock ties between two firms will 
increase the likelihood of subsequent alliance formation between them when the CEO-
board relationships are cooperative in strategic decision making. At the board and 
individual levels, Westphal and Graebner (2010) show that when facing external 
pressures, CEOs and directors tend to increase formal board independence by selecting 
outside directors within their network. Boivie, Bednar, and Barker (2015) also find that 
directors tend to select their interlocking partners as a target of comparison when 
deciding their own compensation. 
In addition, social network theory can also effectively address issues with boards 
of directors because it can address the accumulation and execution of social capital, 
human capital and information capital, which are closely related to the board monitoring 
function, resource provision functions, and the information processing function (Boivie 
et al., 2016a; Coleman, 1988; Freeman, 1979; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Walker, Kogut, 
& Shan, 1997; Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). For example, network size measured by 
degree centrality has long been adopted as a measure of social capital, while network 




status (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Bonacich, 1987, 2007; Podolny, 2001; Shipilov & 
Li, 2008). Network brokerage and centrality are shown to have control and information 
benefits at both the individual and organizational levels (Burt, 2004; Li et al., In press; 
Mazzola et al., 2016; Paruchuri, 2010; Wang, Rodan, Fruin, & Xu, 2014; Whittington, 
Owen-Smith, & Powell, 2009) 
However, until now, only a few studies have adopted social network theory to 
study board and director outcomes (Chu & Davis, 2016). The majority of the current 
interlock research focuses on exploring how network/interlock networks affect firm-
level outcomes (Martin, Gözübüyük, & Becerra, 2015; Sauerwald et al., 2016; Shipilov 
et al., 2017; Shipilov, Greve, & Rowley, 2010; Shipilov & Li, 2008). Within those 
limited studies that adopt the network perspective to study board and director outcomes, 
the majority take the relational perspective to explore the impact of ties (Westphal & 
Shani, 2016; Westphal & Stern, 2006; Zhu & Westphal, 2014). For example, the 
research has shown that the relational embeddedness of a focal director can affect his or 
her decision making (Jiang, Cannella, & Jiao, 2017a; Jiang et al., 2017b). However, the 
network structure, especially the structural aspects of an interlock network established 
by interlocking directors, remains under-studied in the field of boards of directors, and 
particularly in the field of director selection (Kim & Cannella, 2008a; Wiersema et al., 
2018). Given the salient impacts of the structural perspective and its significant 





Another constraint with regard to the current director network studies is the level 
of analyses. Although social network theory allows for multiple level of networks 
(Kilduff & Brass, 2010), the majority of the current interlocking director studies remain 
on the company level (e.g. Howard et al., 2017; Martin et al., 2015; Zheng, Singh, & 
Mitchell, 2015; Zhu & Chen, 2015a). However, the existing board research has 
suggested that individual directors are heterogenous and that personal characteristics are 
significant and distinct (Boivie et al., 2012; Khanna et al., 2014). The broader social 
network research also suggests the relevance of individual actors’ networks (for a recent 
review, see Kilduff & Brass, 2010). As a result, more attention should be paid to a 
director’s individual level network structure and its effects. This is particularly true in 
the director selection setting because director selection refers to the selection of 
individual directors. To overcome the above constraints and provide a greater 
understanding of director selection, this study will explore how the director-level 
network structure may affect the director selection outcome. 
2.1.3. Network structural position and director selection 
As shown by the brief discussion above, the network research has convincingly 
demonstrated that superior network structural positions, including central positions and 
brokerage positions, can provide information and power benefits to the focal actor 
(Bonacich, 1987; Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Burt, 1992, 2004, 2007a; Freeman, 1978, 
1979; Kilduff & Brass, 2010; Provan, Fish, & Sydow, 2007). Such information and 
power benefits have been shown to affect a wide range of significant individual- and 




al., 2015; Shipilov et al., 2017). Building on those findings, I argue that organizations 
may tend to appoint directors who have already occupied those superior network 
positions for the following reasons. 
First, organizations are well aware of the power and information benefits 
associated with those superior network positions and thus may intentionally search for 
individuals who enjoy such benefits (Aharonson, Tzabbar, & Amburgey, 2016). By 
having directors who occupy those superior network positions, organization can leverage 
those directors’ information and power benefits (Ozdemir, Moran, Zhong, & Bliemel, 
2016). Specifically, by having directors who occupy superior network positions and thus 
have higher director capital, organizations may be able to expect better monitoring and 
more resource provision (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Second, when appointing directors, 
organizations are more likely to select certain individuals because they are highly visible 
and thus more likely to be noticed (Boivie et al., 2015). By occupying superior network 
positions, individual directors make themselves highly visible, and they are thus more 
likely to be selected by recruiting companies. In the following sections, I will discuss 
how those two criteria works for individuals who have high centrality and who are 
network brokers. 
Centrality 
Organizations in general want directors who can better realize their board role, 
i.e., provide effective monitoring and valuable resources to reduce their uncertainty 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). I argue that central directors are more 




theory suggests that individuals who are central in networks are widely believed to 
benefit from higher status, higher levels of power, richer transfers of information, and 
greater problem-solving capabilities (Kilduff & Brass, 2010). Given that an interlock 
network is also a type of individual-level social network, a central director within his or 
her interlock network can also enjoy information benefits, power and status benefits, and 
opportunity benefits (Kilduff, Crossland, Tsai, & Bowers, 2016; Martin et al., 2015).  
The information benefits associated with centrality are defined in terms of a 
situation in which a central director can obtain richer information within a shorter period 
of time at lower costs (Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003). By having information benefits, a 
central director has more access to information and can thus perform social comparison 
or benchmarking with other great firms or great practices to develop better monitoring 
procedures (Wang, Gupta, & Grewal, 2017). Opportunity and information benefits can 
also enable a central director to become better informed about the current deficiencies of 
managerial practices and thus discover potential new and innovative monitoring 
procedures (El-Khatib, Fogel, & Jandik, 2015). The power and status benefits associated 
with high centrality refer to a situation in which a central director usually has greater 
network influence over other network partners (Bonacich, 1987; Freeman, 1978, 1979). 
Opportunity benefits enable a central director to discover new opportunities earlier than 
the other directors (Larcker, So, & Wang, 2011; Stuart & Sorenson, 2007). The power 
and opportunity benefits that are embedded in the central position can further help a 
central director to better discover new opportunities of monitoring and better implement 




are also very likely to understand these issues, they may want to have a central director 
on their board to reduce agency costs and perform effective monitoring. 
Being a central director also enables the focal director to provide more and better 
resources to his or her home company and the company where he or she is a director. By 
having a richer stock of knowledge and information and being more capable of 
recognizing and approaching new opportunities (El-Khatib et al., 2015), a central 
director may also be more capable of providing better advice and discovering and 
locating useful information and resources. Simply put, the information and opportunity 
benefits associated with centrality can help a firm make better decisions and become 
more innovative. In addition, a central director is more likely to have the power not only 
to obtain the information and resources he or she has discovered but also to be able to 
leverage his or her status to make better use of those resource (Kleinbaum & Stuart, 
2013; Larcker et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2015). As a result, a central director will be an 
effective resource provider and user and may thus be preferred by recruiting companies. 
Further, by having a central director, a company is able to leverage a central director’ s 
network power and status to increase its own reputation and status and thus make the 
firm more likely to manage external uncertainties, which ultimately leads to competitive 
advantages (Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2013; Larcker et al., 2011; Love, Lim, & Bednar, 
2017; Martin et al., 2015). Given that companies understand the importance of the board 
resource provision role and seek directors who can provide them with greater resources 
and help them manage external uncertainty (Krause et al., 2013), central directors are 




Companies may also expect a central director to better overcome information 
processing bias, including cognitive bias, time constraints, and relational dynamics. 
Given that a central director can accumulate more information within a shorter period of 
time (Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003), he or she should have relatively more time to 
analyze and absorb the information received. By absorbing more information, a central 
director should be more likely to build a less biased view, develop personal capability 
and interpersonal skills, and make more informed decisions (Venkataramani, Richter, & 
Clarke, 2014). By appointing such a central director, the recruiting company should 
obtain an effective director who suffers from fewer information processing barriers.  
Further, a central director is also more likely to be identified by selecting firms 
because he or she is usually better known (Kim & Cannella, 2008c). For example, 
central directors are more likely to be covered by the media (Malinick, Tindall, & Diani, 
2013) or recommended by co-workers because of their higher status and capability. To 
conclude, a central director in a director interlock network is more likely to obtain 
additional board appointments. Therefore, the following is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: a director’s network centrality is positively associated with his or 
her possibility of obtaining subsequent additional board appointments. 
Brokerage 
Brokerage position, which is defined as a network position that can bridge diverse 
and disconnected actors, is another widely recognized superior network position (Burt, 
1980b, 1992; Freeman, 1977). Network brokers enjoy information and vision benefits 




2000, 2004; Obstfeld, Borgatti, & Davis, 2014). The empirical evidence has suggested 
that at both the individual and organizational levels, brokers tend to perform better; 
receive higher salaries, faster promotions, and higher bonuses (Burt, 2007a; Burt, 
Hogarth, & Michaud, 2000; Fleming & Waguespack, 2007; Li et al., In press; Obstfeld 
et al., 2014; Reinecke & Ansari, 2015). In addition, brokers enjoy power and control 
benefits because they are the only channel to exchange information flow for two 
unconnected parties, and thus, they have the power to decide whether to bring together 
unconnected parties, and thus their opinions have greater influence (Burt, 2004, 2007a). 
Given that companies can leverage diversified information and control power to create 
value and reduce uncertainty, they may also tend to appoint directors who occupy a 
brokerage position (Martin et al., 2015; Shropshire, 2010). 
First, by having a broker director on a board, an organization may be able to 
obtain a better monitor. Similar to central directors, directors who are network brokers 
can enjoy network information benefits (Fleming et al., 2007). However, central 
directors’ information benefits come from the fact that they are well-connected and 
thus have more access to information, whereas network brokers’ information benefits are 
obtained by tying to diversified disconnected individuals (Li et al., In press). By tying to 
diversified disconnected individuals, brokers can gain privileged access to diversified 
and non-redundant information (Burt, 2004). This valuable information enables broker 
directors to create a unique and innovative combination of information, which can help 




opportunities. As a result, companies may want to have network brokers on their board 
for monitoring purposes. 
In addition, by having network brokers on their boards, companies can obtain 
more resources and be better able to manage external uncertainties. By absorbing 
diversified and non-redundant information, network brokers can develop more 
innovative advice and identify novel resources to better fulfill their resource provision 
role (Hoang & Antoncic, 2003). In addition, network brokers enjoy control power over 
their direct contacts who reply on the brokers to obtain information (Burt, 2007b). By 
having network brokers on their board, companies can leverage such control and power 
benefits to better develop external relationships with those direct contacts (i.e., other 
directors) and their organizations. As a result, by having network brokers on a board, 
focal companies can gain power and status over their interlock partners and thus reduce 
external uncertainties. Further, diversified and non-redundant information enable a 
network broker to develop a deeper understanding about governance practices without 
over-absorbing similar information; thus, they overcome the cognitive bias and time 
constraints of processing information (Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 2002). Last, but 
not least, given network brokers’ power and information benefits, they are also very 
visible and easily noticed by recruiting companies. Therefore, the following is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2: a director’s network brokerage is positively associated with his or 






2.1.4. Gender as an individual-level contingency 
As discussed above, firms may select directors based on the candidates’ network 
position. However, firms may need to make a selection decision when two individuals 
have similar network structural positions. Although social network theory assumes 
structural equivalence, which suggests that two network actors who occupy the same 
network structural position enjoy the same network benefits, recruiting firms must still 
consider the heterogeneity of those two actors because two director candidates can be 
very different in terms of their personal attributes (Mizruchi, 1993; Walker, 1985; 
Westphal & Shani, 2016). Given that the CEO and top management team research has 
suggested that personal attributes can affect managers’ decision making, and the fact that 
the board research has shown that an aggregation of personal attributes at the board level 
can influence board decision making, it is necessary to explore how different director 
attributes can moderate the relationship between network structural position and 
selection outcome (Boivie et al., 2012; Graffin, Boivie, & Carpenter, 2013; Lange, 
Boivie, & Westphal, 2015; Westphal et al., 2006).  
Individuals can have multiple personal attributes. Among all such attributes, 
gender is one of the most widely studied and has been shown to significantly affect the 
treatment an individual may receive (Chen et al., 2016; Lyngsie & Foss, 2017; Shan, Fu, 
& Zheng, 2017). In the management field, much attention has been paid to gender 
diversity, especially gender diversity in boards or top management teams (Abdullah, 
Ismail, & Nachum, 2016; Chen et al., 2016; Post & Byron, 2015; Zhang & Qu, 2016). 




echelons of organizations (Chen et al., 2016; Gregorič et al., 2017). Specifically, 
according to the most recent survey from 2020 Women on Boards (2017) and a news 
report from Fortune website (2017), approximately 22 percent of directors are women in 
Fortune 500 companies, and only 24 CEOs are female.  
However, the situation is changing. The evidence suggests that there is an 
increasing number of female representations on boards (2017). Further, Chu and Davis 
(2016) have suggested that female directors tend to be more central in their network. To 
explain this, the research has shown that female board representation is associated with 
better performance (Abdullah et al., 2016; Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Dezsö & Ross, 
2012; Joshi, 2014; Joshi, Son, & Roh, 2015; Park & Westphal, 2013; Post & Byron, 
2015; Zhang & Qu, 2016). Further, Hillman, Shropshire, and Cannella (2007) argue that 
organizations are seeking female directors to reduce external pressure for diversity and 
to increase legitimacy. Recently, Leslie, Manchester, and Dahm (2017) have shown that 
only high potential females can reverse the negative gender-treatment relationship and 
enjoy the premium of being female. Following these arguments, I argue that female 
directors, especially female directors who occupy an advantageous network position, 
will be popular in the director labor market. This popularity, together with the main 
effect of network structure, leads to an argument that if a key director, i.e., a central 
director or broker director, is female, she will be more likely to obtain an additional 




H3: Being female positively moderates the relationship in H1; that is, when a 
central director is female, the positive relationship between centrality and additional 
board appointment becomes stronger. 
H4: Being female positively moderates the relationship in H2; that is, when the 
broker director is female, the positive relationship between brokerage and additional 
board appointment becomes stronger. 
2.1.5. Director’s home firm performance as an organizational level contingency 
In addition to individual-level contingencies, organizational-level characteristics 
may interact with network properties to affect director selection (Hillman et al., 2007). 
The financial performance of the director candidate’s home firm can be a very important 
contingency. The past research has shown that poor performance is a major driver for 
CEO and director turnover, either voluntary or involuntary, because firm performance is 
a key metric that is used to evaluate CEO and director performance, and failing to meet 
performance expectations can lead to higher pressure for turnover (Arthaud-Day et al., 
2006; Boivie et al., 2012; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Harrison et al., In press; Marcel & 
Cowen, 2014). This evidence indicates that external stakeholders view firm performance 
as an important indicator to reflect the capability of focal directors. 
Given that recruiting companies want directors who can successfully leverage 
their network benefits to help their company (i.e., their home company and the 
companies where they serve on the board), it is very likely that those recruiting 
companies will use their home firm’s performance as an evaluation criterion. Although 




research has shown that the recruiting firm will consider director candidates’ previous 
work experience (Zhu & Chen, 2015a, b; Zhu, Shen, & Hillman, 2014; Zhu & Westphal, 
2014). Therefore, when the financial performance of a director candidate’s home 
company is relatively low, the recruiting company will notice it and may infer that the 
director’s capability of leveraging his or her network benefits to help his or her home 
firm is limited. In such case, the recruiting company may question whether the candidate 
director could successfully leverage his or her network position benefits to help the 
recruiting firm. In addition, companies that are low in performance usually face many 
external challenges. By appointing directors from such companies, the recruiting 
companies may also face external challenges about their decision due to the potential 
negative reputational spillover. Given that lower performance also represents a higher 
risk of organizational failure, tying to a company with lower performance also increases 
the uncertainty and risks for recruiting companies. Those uncertainties and risks may 
cancel out the network benefits of the director candidates; thus, the recruiting company 
may no longer favor them. As a result, a recruiting firm may look for other director 
candidates who have a relatively similar network position but do not suffer from lower 
financial performance at their home company. 
However, when the financial performance of a director candidate’s home company 
is relatively high, the recruiting company is more likely to believe that the director 
candidate is capable of successfully leveraging his or her network benefits in helping his 
or her home companies. In addition, building a tie with a well-performing firm 




partners. Together, these factors strengthen the attractiveness of the focal director 
candidate’s network benefits, thus making the recruiting company more likely to offer 
the focal director candidate the position. Therefore, the following is proposed: 
H5: A director’s home firm performance positively moderates the relationship in 
H1; that is, when a central director’s home firm obtains higher performance, the 
positive relationship between director centrality and additional board appointment 
becomes stronger. 
H6: A director’s home firm performance positively moderates the relationship in 
H2; that is, when a broker director’s home firm obtains higher performance, the positive 
relationship between director brokerage and additional board appointment becomes 
stronger. 
2.1.6. Recruiting firm’s network positions 
Recruiting firm’s network centrality 
In addition to directors’ network positions, recruiting firms’ network positions 
should also affect director selection. As I proposed in Hypothesis 1, recruiting firms may 
be particularly interested in potential information and power benefits that a more central 
director candidate can bring in. However, recruiting firms’ interests on high centrality 
individuals may become reduced when they already have high centrality. Specifically, 
when a recruiting firm occupies a more central position in its network, the firm may 
already be able to obtain external resources, discover opportunities and establish 
network structural power (Kilduff et al., 2016; Martin et al., 2015). Thus, compared to 




firm can have a reduced need to look for another central director. This should be true for 
two main reasons. 
First of all, a central recruiting firm may have a reduced need on information 
benefits provided by a new central director because too much information can increase 
the information processing barriers faced by board members (Ahuja, 2000). It could be 
possible that the recruiting firm still emphasizes potential information and resources 
provided by each director candidate. However, when the recruiting firms already have 
lots of accesses to information and power, they are more likely to look for director 
candidates who may bring in heterogeneous information instead of individuals who can 
merely increase their connections to get information. Under this situation, the focal 
boards can become less interested in a director candidate who only has high network 
centrality. Therefore, director centrality is viewed less positively when the board already 
has centrality, because it is more redundant. The marginal benefits it provides will be 
smaller. 
Second, a more central recruiting firm may have a reduced need for any power 
benefits provided by a new central director. When a recruiting firm has a higher level of 
network centrality in the interlock network, its board members are also able to have 
relatively higher power over other directors in the network. It is less necessary for the 
recruiting firm with high network structural power (i.e., centrality) to look for a director 
who also has high network structural power to further increase the network power and 
status of the focal firm. To the contrary, board members of a central firm may not want 




an influential person may change the current power dynamics of the board and lead to 
further conflicts and competitions within the boardroom. For example, Acharya and 
Pollock (2013) found that when a prestigious board recruits new outside directors, its 
preexisting board prestige has a diminishing positive effect on selecting a prestigious 
director. Although Acharya and Pollock (2013)’s findings are on board status based on 
individual demographic and functional backgrounds, the fundamental psychological 
process of board members should remain the same. Therefore, 
H7: A recruiting firm’s centrality negatively moderates the relationship in H1; 
that is, when a recruiting firm has higher centrality, the positive relationship between 
director centrality and additional board appointments becomes weaker. 
However, this may be a different case when a more central firm evaluates a 
director candidate who has more brokerage positions. I argue that a more central 
recruiting firm will be more likely to value director candidates who has more brokerage 
positions.  
First, different from directors who have high centrality, directors who have more 
brokerages can provide more heterogenous knowledge with reduced information 
redundancy. A central firm is usually able to establish enough connections to acquire 
information. However, the acquired information can easily be homogenous and 
redundant, especially in a condensed network. To make sure the focal boards can acquire 
timely diversified information for better realizing their roles, the central firm needs 
someone who can provide them heterogenous knowledge with very few information 




redundant. However, the brokerage position can usually provide the network broker 
heterogenous knowledge, with a reduced likelihood to create the problem of information 
redundancy, because a network broker can connect two or more unconnected parties and 
get information from those parties. 
Although there are information processing costs to brokerage positions, the 
benefits should outweigh the additional costs. The network benefits and novelty acquired 
from processing that diversified information can bring the recruiting boards addition 
opportunities and resources (Burt, 1980b; Burt, 1982; Burt, 1992, 2000, 2004; Obstfeld 
et al., 2014). For example, diversified information can enable the board to have more 
knowledge to understand their environment and competitors, and thus better help CEO 
to operate the company. In addition, more central firms which have higher power and 
status are usually under pressure to maintain their current power and status (Mishina, 
Dykes, Block, & Pollock, 2010). Therefore, central recruiting firms which have higher 
network centrality are more eager to look for different knowledge which may help 
expand current network, conduct innovation, and increase performance to maintain their 
existing status. As a result, a director who can provide more diversified information are 
more preferred.  
Further, recruiting a director who has more brokerages may help the central board 
to reduce its information processing barriers by increasing its overall information 
processing capability. Given that network brokers are usually someone who needs to 
process lots of heterogeneous knowledge and effectively absorb them to take fully 




process information (Rothaermel & Hess, 2007). Therefore, by bringing in a director 
who is a network broker, the recruiting firm can integrate and absorb this capability to 
help them process information. Given that a central firm usually face more network 
processing barriers caused by its numerus connections, a central firm should be more 
likely to be interested in a new director who has more network brokerage positions. 
One thing to note, in reality during the recruiting process, the focal board may not 
fully be aware of the benefits of network brokerage positions owned by each individual 
and thus discuss this character actively. However, when the focal board members 
evaluate resources which can be provided by each director candidate, they would 
probably check each director candidate’s network connections. Then the focal board 
members should understand the unique information benefits can be provided by a focal 
director when they see a focal director serves as the only connection between two 
diversified group. This can be particularly true when the focal board try to establish ties 
with the group(s) the focal individual connected. 
Last but not least, the control benefits associated with a director candidate who is a 
network broker would not challenge the preexisting power dynamics of the recruiting 
board. The control benefits associated with brokerage position are usually limited to the 
focal director’s direct unconnected parties, and thus can hardly affect the director 
candidate’s overall network power and network status. As a result, board members of the 
recruiting firm can become less worried about bringing a competitor who is high in 
power. Therefore, board members of a central recruiting company become less 




H8: A recruiting firm’s centrality positively moderates the relationship in H2; that 
is, when a recruiting firm has higher centrality, the positive relationship between 
director brokerage and additional board appointment becomes stronger. 
Recruiting firm’s network brokerage 
In addition to centrality, the recruiting firm’s brokerage position may also affect 
their preference in selecting directors. Firms which have more brokerage positions may 
be interested in directors who have higher centrality to gain network status and structure 
power. A director candidate with higher network centrality can effectively increase the 
recruiting firm’s network centrality by bringing in additional connections, and thus 
increase the network structural power and status of the focal firm (Bonacich, 1987; 
Shipilov & Li, 2008). Compared to other recruiting firms, a recruiting firm which have 
more brokerage usually has more diversified information, and thus is more informed 
about the power and status benefits of having a central director. In addition, a recruiting 
firm which has more network brokerage position can also have stronger control over its 
unconnected partners, and thus can leverage those partners to locate central directors. As 
a result, a recruiting firm which has more network brokerage is more eager and also 
more likely to recruit a central director. Different from the central recruiting firms, a 
recruiting firm which has more network brokerage positions, would be less likely to be 
concerned with power and status conflicts on board because higher brokerage does not 
guarantee overall network power. Instead, board members may be more open to 
welcome network central people to help them increase their overall network power. 




H9: A recruiting firm’s brokerage positively moderates the relationship in H2; 
that is, when a recruiting firm has more brokerage, the positive relationship between 
director centrality and additional board appointment becomes stronger. 
When a recruiting firm has more brokerage positions, its board may become more 
aware of the importance of network brokerage and information benefits, and thus tend to 
select a director who also serves as a network broker. In addition, since boards of a 
broker firm may need to process massive information flows, they should prefer a 
director who can provide more information with less redundancy. In addition, the 
recruiting firm may want to have someone who has more experiences in processing 
heterogeneous knowledge and thus can help the boards to establish and increase their 
information absorption capability. Also, although bringing in a director candidate with 
lots of brokerages can further increase their information flows, the new pieces of 
heterogeneous information brought in by the individual may help the recruiting firm to 
better understand and thus process their existing information. Compared to other 
companies, recruiting firms which have more brokerage are also better able to identify 
candidates, including candidates with more brokerage positions.  
H10: A recruiting firm’s brokerage positively moderates the relationship in H2; 
that is, when a recruiting firm has more brokerage, the positive relationship between 







2.2. Theory and Hypotheses for Study 2 
2.2.1. Director exit 
The existing research on director exit shows that scandals and financial crises are 
major drivers for director exit (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Daily & Dalton, 1995; 
Harrison et al., In press; Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Withers et al., 2012a). Some interpret 
this evidence as suggesting that directors are fired for poor performance based on 
scandal or financial fraud (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Marcel & 
Cowen, 2014). For example, the research has argued that firing current directors is a 
salient way to repair organizational legitimacy when facing financial crisis (Arthaud-
Day et al., 2006; Marcel & Cowen, 2014). Others suggest that the director turnover 
process is more agentic and voluntary because directors want to decouple themselves 
from companies’ compromised reputations (Harrison et al., In press; Withers et al., 
2013). For example, a recent study suggests that organizational downgrade based on 
financial analysis can drive director exit because directors must protect their personal 
reputation and avoid negative reputational spillover from downgraded organizations 
(Harrison et al., In press). 
Although this stream of research provides the valuable insight that director exit 
can be associated with reputational and performance threats, we still have a limited 
understanding about other drivers of director exit in non-crisis periods (Boivie et al., 
2012). However, as director exit can occur at any time, companies may be eager to 
identify the other drivers of director exit, especially when such companies aim to retain 




suggested that the prestige associated with being a director, the ability to have influence, 
and identification with the director role decrease the likelihood of director exit while the 
time commitment required, holding other board appointments, and serving as a CEO at 
another company can increase the likelihood of director exit. This research first confirms 
that directors stay on boards for personal benefit. The failure to meet personal benefits or 
a change of situation may lead to director exit. As a result, this study finds that it is 
necessary to explore other potential causes of director exit from an individual 
perspective. This exploration can be especially important for corporations that seek to 
maintain their current directors and face a lower risk of financial crisis or negative 
median coverage. 
In such cases, the question changes to why do directors remain on boards? 
Unfortunately, this is another great unanswered question. However, the qualitative 
evidence has long suggested that directors may serve to gain network benefits and social 
capital (Lorsch, 2012; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Recently, the empirical evidence has 
finally provided some support to this claim by showing that directors who have board 
experience can accumulate more social and human capital, achieve higher prestige, and 
more easily be promoted to executive roles (Boivie et al., 2016b). Similarly, Westphal 
and colleagues have shown that being a director is a way for individuals to gain entry 
into the elite network (McDonald & Westphal, 2010; Park & Westphal, 2013; Westphal 
& Khanna, 2003; Westphal & Shani, 2016). Within this elite group, certain interpersonal 
interaction behaviors can help directors accumulate social capital and gain other career 




that directors are motivated to stay on boards to gain social capital (Lorsch, 2012; Lorsch 
& MacIver, 1989).  
As social capital is a major incentive for directors to stay on board, I argue that 
directors may also decide to exit from a board to maximize their social capital. First, it is 
clear that being a director is not cost-free (Lorsch, 2012). The research has suggested 
that time commitment, the ability to handle multiple directorships, and the ability to 
balance directorship and managerial roles are major constraints of directors in handling 
multiple jobs (Boivie et al., 2016a; Boivie et al., 2012; Tuggle, Sirmon, Reutzel, & 
Bierman, 2010). For example, an individual serves on five boards of 5 small companies. 
However, she receives a board offer from a Fortune 500 company, and that board offer 
requires a high level of daily engagement. As a result, she may have to leave one or two 
boards to take the influential seat from that Fortune 500 company. Such time and 
capability constraints become more severe over time because increasing globalization 
and hypercomputation significantly escalate the task complexity facing directors, which 
may cause them to feel pressured to sit on multiple boards (Lorsch, 2012). Meanwhile, 
directors’ current board roles and the prestige associated with such board roles may 
continuously bring directors other, better board- and career opportunities (Boivie et al., 
2016b). When they are faced with this situation, directors must make wise decisions and 
strategically give up some opportunities so that they can carefully manage their 
directorship portfolio to maximize their gain of social capital. As a result, directors may 





2.2.2. Network structure and director exit 
As I argued above that directors may leave their current boards to pursue better 
opportunities, the next question is to identify which director is most likely to leave. 
Directors who can gain access to more board relevant information may become more 
likely to leave. This is because the existing research on opportunity recognition has 
shown that individuals who have more access to relevant information usually have a 
higher chance of finding external opportunities and higher levels of relational discretion 
(Hoang & Antoncic, 2003; Ma, Huang, & Shenkar, 2011). Building on this argument, I 
further argue that directors who have more access to board-related information may also 
be better able to find board opportunities. This is because when individual directors have 
plenty of information about other boards, they can better determine whether there are 
employment opportunities and whether they fit those positions. Further, directors who 
have more information about other boards can also better evaluate each opportunity and 
make changes accordingly. As we already know that each director can only handle a 
limited number of board seats, a focal director may have to remove some existing board 
roles to better pursue the newly recognized opportunities. As a result, directors who have 
more access to board relevant information may become more likely to leave their current 
board.  
Brokerage 
Which director has more access to board relevant information? Perhaps those who 
have occupied advantageous network positions (Kleinbaum & Stuart, 2013; Li et al., In 




significant information benefits from occupying superior network structural positions 
(Perry-Smith, 2006; Shin, Kim, Lee, & Bian, 2012). A brokerage position, i.e., 
occupying a position in which the broker is the only connection to two unconnected 
contacts within a network, is a superior network position and a key source of information 
(Burt, 1992; Venkataramani et al., 2014). The research has shown that being a network 
broker enables individuals to obtain and combine heterogeneous and non-redundant 
knowledge from partners who are not directly connected (Burt, 1992, 2000, 2004, 
2007a; Burt, 2007b; Burt, Kilduff, & Tasselli, 2013; Li et al., In press). Considerable 
evidence has been accumulated on the advantages of occupying a brokerage position, 
which provides timely access to information about opportunities and the control of 
information flowing between partners (Clement, Shipilov, & Galunic, 2017; Galunic, 
Ertug, & Gargiulo, 2012). Therefore, a local, structurally embedded network provides 
informational opportunities and reduces the uncertainty and risks associated with 
partnering with individuals who are not connected with current partners (Burt, 1992; 
Burt, 2009). 
Applying those arguments to the context of director exit, I argue that the 
information benefits associated with the brokerage position can contribute to director 
exit. In a director interlock network, directors who occupy a brokerage position are able 
to obtain heterogeneous business information (Martin et al., 2015). For example, a 
director who is a network broker may be able to identify other board opportunities, 
entrepreneurial opportunities, or managerial opportunities (Burt, 2002, 2004; Kilduff & 




information from network contacts, the focal director can identify more opportunities (Li 
et al., in press). In addition, being a network broker also includes the power of 
controlling information flows between disconnected network actors (Burt, 2002). As a 
result, a focal director may also have more network discretion on new partner selection 
and tie dissolution (Brass et al., 2004) and thus suffer less from network relational inertia 
(Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000). Therefore, the focal director is also more likely to explore 
and ultimately win new opportunities. Given the director’s potential time and capability 
constraints of focusing on multiple roles and opportunities, such director also becomes 
more likely to drop one or multiple current board roles in his or her portfolio to better 
pursue those identified opportunities (Boivie et al., 2016a; Boivie et al., 2012; Lorsch, 
2012; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989).  
In addition, as the information and opportunities that flow among network brokers 
are usually diversified and homogenous, the focal director may have to spend extra time 
analyzing and absorbing this information (Ahuja, 2000). This absorption time may 
increase the focal directors’ time constraints and thus increase the chances of his or her 
giving up some of his or her current board roles. Further, given the heterogeneity of 
information acquired from occupying a brokerage position, the opportunities that are 
discovered by network brokers may also be relatively novel and unfamiliar to the focal 
director (Burt, 2004). Therefore, when the focal director decides to pursue such 
opportunities, he or she may have to devote more time and focus on his or her new roles, 




a current board. As the result, the focal director may become more likely to exit from a 
current board. 
H1: A director’s network brokerage is positively associated with the likelihood of 
director exit 
Centrality 
A boundary-spanning brokerage position is not the only advantageous network 
position from which a director can obtain information benefits. Being central in a 
network is another well-established source to gain network informational advantage 
(Martin et al., 2015; Paruchuri, 2010). A central individual within his or her network is 
usually well-connected, enjoys an increased volume of information flow, and thus 
achieves better performance (Barsness, Diekmann, & Seidel, 2005; Perry-Smith, 2006; 
Sparrowe, Liden, Wayne, & Kraimer, 2001). Specifically, by being widely connected, a 
central individual can be more aware of what is going on within his or her network and 
thus has a greater scope than noncentral individuals for collecting and disseminating 
information. This great volume of information flow to central individuals helps the 
central individual identify opportunities and select partners (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986; 
Barsness et al., 2005; Larcker et al., 2011; Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003). Meanwhile, 
opportunities and potential partners are also more likely to notice the central individual 
because central individuals are more prominent within a network (Ibarra, 1993). Such 
prominence and visibility further enable the central individual to receive greater access 




to explore new opportunities, build new ties and dissolving existing ties (Hackman, 
1985; Mintz & Schwartz, 1981; Mossholder, Settoon, & Henagan, 2005).  
The central person in a network can also enjoy power and status benefits, meaning 
that the central individual can have more power over other noncentral partners 
(Bonacich, 1987; Ibarra, 1993). This power and status comes from several sources. The 
first source is the power and status that are embedded in the network hierarchy 
(Bunderson, 2003). Network centrality represents a high position in a status hierarchy, 
especially when the central actor has more indirect ties (Weick, 1996). Second, being 
central in a network indicates higher degrees of access to and control over valued 
information and resources (Burt, 1982). The central person can usually obtain a variety 
of resources and information and thus has power to decide the direction of the 
information outflow (Freeman, 1977; Mizruchi & Bunting, 1981; Roy & Bonacich, 
1988). Further, with greater connections to and control of information and resources, 
central individuals suffer from lower uncertainty, fewer resource and information 
constraints, and thus they have more discretion to change ties without a great sacrifice of 
access to information and resources (Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Martin et al., 
2015). 
In support of this view, the empirical evidence at both the individual level and the 
corporate level has convincingly demonstrated that network centrality is a significant 
source of power (Brass, 1992; Brass & Burkhardt, 1992; Brass & Burkhardt, 1993). 
Further, the more current research has taken network centrality as a measure of network 




power, central individuals usually face a lower level of uncertainty and thus become 
more popular as a network partner because others may be able to decrease their 
uncertainty through ties to central individuals (Kim et al., 2006). As a result, central 
individuals may have more partner options and opportunities to obtain power (Kim & 
Cannella, 2008b; Kim & Cannella, 2008a). The research on both the organization level 
and the individual level has also shown that network centrality is usually positively 
associated with a higher rate of tie dissolution and new tie formation (Feeley, Hwang, & 
Barnett, 2008; Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchell, 2011) (Feeley, Hwang, & Barnett, 2008; 
Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchel, 2011). 
In the context of a director network, when a director is central in his or her 
network, that director first obtains information benefits (Larcker et al., 2011; Shropshire, 
2010). The focal director may have greater access to information and resources and is 
thus more aware of market opportunities and ways by which to realize those 
opportunities (Mizruchi, 1996). As a result, widely connected directors may become 
more likely to identify better opportunities elsewhere and decide to leave their current 
companies given their limited time and capability. In support of this argument, Boivie et 
al. (2012) found that the total number of interlock ties (i.e., a measure of network size) is 
positively associated with director exit. 
In addition to the wide connectivity and great size, central directors have greater 
power and status over the other directors and thus have greater discretion in selecting 
partners (Hoffman, Stearns, & Shrader, 1990; Shropshire, 2010). This discretion can 




may have control of information and resources, they usually suffer from lower 
dependence on any existing ties and thus can dissolve existing ties easier than other 
directors (Weick, 1996). As a result, the central director can leave an existing board at a 
relatively lower cost and be better able to explore new opportunities or new 
combinations of opportunities.  
Given that all directors suffer from personal information processing barriers and 
can only handle a limited number of board roles, any explorations of other, better board 
opportunities to maximize their social capital may increase their likelihood of exiting 
from current boards (Lorsch, 2012; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Actually, central directors 
are even more likely to leave their current boards because they suffer from greater 
information processing barriers due to the great amount of information they receive 
(Boivie et al., 2016a; Khanna et al., 2014). In addition, because of their wide 
connectivity and power hierarchy, central directors may be compelled to spend a great 
deal of time managing their current network ties and absorbing and taking advantage of 
information and opportunities flows. All these activities require time and thus can cause 
central directors to face tighter time and capability constraints. These increased 
constraints make it difficult for central directors to manage multiple board roles and 
further increase their chances of exiting from current boards to explore better 
opportunities. Specifically, to distinguish the current study from the existing research on 
network size and to better capture both the information and power and status aspect of 
director centrality, I have adopted eigenvector centrality as the measure of network 




H2: An individual’s network eigenvector centrality is positively associated with 
the likelihood of director exit 
2.2.3. Gender as an individual-level contingency 
Individual factors can affect individuals’ decision making (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984). Following this logic, directors’ individual characteristics may affect their exit 
decision (Boivie et al., 2012). This is a particularly critical factor in network settings 
because social network theory assumes structural equivalence, which suggests that two 
network actors who occupy the same network structural position enjoy the same network 
benefits and will behave similarly (Mizruchi, 1993; Walker, 1985; Westphal & Shani, 
2016). Given that companies may want to understand how to retain some specific 
directors, it is important to understand the role of individual factors as a contingency. 
Personal risk preference can be a salient individual factor. Although a director 
who occupies a brokerage or central position can enjoy information and power benefits, 
exiting a current board is nevertheless a risky decision because a tie dissolution decision 
may reduce the focal director’s centrality or even break his or her brokerage position. 
Further, a tie dissolution decision may lead to a loss of the focal director’s current 
prestige and the potential opportunities associated with remaining in other board roles 
(Broschak, 2004; Broschak & Block, 2014). Therefore, a director who occupies the 
central or brokerage position has a higher level of risk avoidance and may be less likely 
to exit from a current board even though the focal director has sufficient information. 
The current literature suggests that gender plays a key role in deciding an 




general, females are less likely to take risks compared with their male colleagues 
(Steinbach, Devers, McNamara, & Li, 2016). For example, Chen et al. (2016) have 
found that greater female representation on a firm's board will be negatively associated 
with the number of acquisitions and acquisition size due to their higher level of risk 
avoidance. The research has also found that certain personality traits, including hubris, 
which are closely related to risk-taking behavior, such as acquiring behavior, are less 
likely to be found in females (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). In addition, females are also 
shown to prefer stable ties, and they are good at building trust to enhance current ties 
(Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). Building on this stream of 
research, I argue that when a director is female, her risk avoidance will make her less 
likely to make an exit decision compared to her male colleagues who occupy a similar 
network position. Therefore, the following is proposed: 
H3: Gender negatively moderates the relationship in H1. That is, when the focal 
director is female, the relationship between a director’s network brokerage and her 
likelihood of exit from the focal firm is weaker. 
H4: Gender negatively moderates the relationship in H2. That is, when the focal 
director is female, the relationship between a director’s network centrality and her 
likelihood of exit from the focal firm is weaker. 
2.2.4. Firm performance as a firm-level contingency 
In addition to individual-level contingencies, firm-level heterogeneity can also 
affect the relationship between network structural position and director exit (Boivie et 




understand director exit and develop a strategy to maintain their own directors, firm-
level contingencies are worth exploring. Firm financial performance can be an important 
fact to consider.  
Financial performance is widely used by investors, banks, and analysts as a key 
standard to evaluate firm competitiveness and thus acts as a key scale to evaluate 
corporate governance and board effectiveness (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Daily & 
Dalton, 1995; Harrison et al., In press; Marcel & Cowen, 2014). Good financial 
performance is also viewed as a sign of great corporate governance, well-functioned 
boards, and effective directors (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Therefore, directors from 
firms with better performance can have a higher level of reputation, and they thus are 
more likely to obtain better opportunities (Withers et al., 2012b). From this standpoint, 
directors seem less likely to leave a company with good performance simply because 
well-performing companies may bring them more opportunities and status. Moreover, 
the research has found that directors from companies with better performance may have 
developed a higher level of identification of their companies and become more satisfied 
with their current director job (Carmeli, Gilat, & Waldman, 2007; Collins & Clark, 
2003). These enjoyable personal feelings can cause a focal director to become less likely 
to leave (Withers et al., 2013). The direct empirical evidence has also shown that firm 
financial performance has a strong main effect on director turnover (Boivie et al., 2012).  
Given the significance of financial performance, it is important to explore whether 
and how it can affect the relationship between network structural positions and director 




occupied a superior network position, i.e., a brokerage position or a central position, 
decides to leave, he or she is less likely to leave a company with high performance. 
Given that directors who occupy brokerage or central positions can have higher power in 
controlling partner selection and tie dissolution, they can have the power to decide which 
company to leave. As the research has already established that financial performance is 
negatively associated with director exit (Boivie et al., 2012), I argue that when directors 
who occupy either central or brokerage positions want to re-arrange their directorship 
portfolio and leave current boards, they are less likely to leave a company with good 
performance. Therefore, the following is proposed: 
H5: The performance of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates the 
relationship in H1. That is, the better the performance of a focal firm, the weaker the 
relationship between a director’s network brokerage and his or her likelihood of exit 
from the focal firm. 
H6: The performance of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates the 
relationship in H2. That is, the better the performance of a focal firm, the weaker the 
relationship between a director’s network centrality and his or her likelihood of exit 
from the focal firm. 
2.2.5. Current firm’s network positions 
Current firm’s network centrality 
Although directors who occupy superior network positions, including network 
brokerage position and central position, are more informed about potential opportunities 




directors are less likely to leave a company which can provide them lots of network 
benefits. Therefore, when individual directors plan their potential exit, they will 
carefully consider the network position of the company they may leave.  
A director is less likely to leave a company which has higher network status, i.e. 
network centrality. A company’s network centrality can reflect the overall network 
structural power, network connections, and thus the network status of the focal firm 
(Bonacich, 1987; Shipilov & Li, 2008). Higher levels of network centrality represent that 
the focal firm will have higher influencing power over other firms, more accesses to 
information and resources, and thus more opportunities and network discretions (Aldrich 
& Zimmer, 1986; Barsness et al., 2005; Larcker et al., 2011). Being a director of a firm, 
which has high network centrality, the focal director can also enjoy those benefits 
provided by this company. In addition, serving on board of a company high in network 
centrality may help a director better label himself/herself since serving on a prestigious 
board can also increase his/her prestige and thus help him/her obtain more career 
opportunities. As research suggested, directors in general value prestige and power 
(Acharya & Pollock, 2013).  
In addition, leaving a company with a higher level of network centrality may hurt 
a director’s individual network status. Leaving a company may lead to tie dissolutions at 
individual level, and this can be particularly true when the company has higher network 
centrality. In other words, when a director decides to leave a company that has higher 
network centrality, he/she undertakes the risk of losing his/her existing superior network 




merely because the other parties want to tie to the central company, which the focal 
director decides to leave. If this is the case, a focal director may become less likely to 
leave a company which has higher network centrality to make sure that he/she won’t not 
experience a big loss in network capital.  
The above arguments can be true for directors who have more network brokerages 
or directors who have high centrality. First, network brokers and central directors usually 
have more accesses to information and thus can be more accurately evaluate how 
beneficial it can be to serve on board on a company which has high network centrality. 
Second, network brokers and central directors are experiencing the network benefits 
associated with their network superior position, and thus would be less willing to take 
risks which may result in losing of existing network superior position. Therefore,  
H7: The network centrality of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates 
the relationship in H1. That is, the more central a focal firm is, the weaker the 
relationship between a director’s network brokerage and his or her likelihood of exit 
from the focal firm. 
H8: The network centrality of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates 
the relationship in H2. That is, the more central a focal firm is, the weaker the 
relationship between a director’s network centrality and his or her likelihood of exit 
from the focal firm. 
Current firm’s network brokerage 
Similarly, when a company has many network brokerages, its board of directors 




directors in other companies (Burt, 1992, 2000, 2004, 2007a; Burt, 2007b; Burt et al., 
2013). This information source can help directors in tremendous ways, such as 
discovering career opportunities, developing personal skills and capabilities, and 
acquiring resources (Clement et al., 2017; Galunic et al., 2012). Further, when a 
company has network brokerages, its directors can leverage this brokerage to have 
controlling power over other directors of their directly connected firms. This controlling 
power can help directors of the focal company acquire necessary resources from other 
directly connected individuals, gain network power and discretions, and establish 
prestigious. All in all, similar to a focal firm which has higher network centrality, a focal 
firm has more network brokerage can also provide their directors with lots of benefits 
and thus help them in their career. As a result, directors are not likely to leave companies 
which have lots of brokerages. Specifically, central directors and broker directors may 
be more likely to stay in firms which have high brokerage because the existence of their 
brokerage or centrality may heavily depend on the firm. To avoid any potential loss, they 
would choose not to take the risk to leave. 
Further, the superior network position, i.e., network centrality and brokerage, of 
directors enable them to better evaluate the value of a focal firm with high brokerage and 
thus become less likely to leave. Therefore, I propose, 
H9: The network brokerage of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates 
the relationship in H1. That is, the more network brokerage a focal firm has, the weaker 
the relationship between a director’s network brokerage and his or her likelihood of exit 




H10: The network brokerage of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates 
the relationship in H2. That is, the more network brokerage a focal firm has, the weaker 
the relationship between a director’s network centrality and his or her likelihood of exit 
from the focal firm. 
2.3. Theory and Hypotheses for Study 3 
2.3.1. Director mobility 
Director mobility may have three major components, director selection, director 
exit, and the link between selection and exit. A majority of the existing director selection 
studies take a firm perspective to explore which directors will be selected by the firm 
(Cashman et al., 2013; Keys & Li, 2005; Kim & Cannella, 2008c; Westphal & Stern, 
2006; Zhu & Chen, 2015b; Zhu & Westphal, 2014). For example, the research has 
shown that directors who are well connected are preferred by recruiting companies 
(Cashman et al., 2013; Kim & Cannella, 2008c). In addition, female directors and 
minority directors are more likely to be selected by companies under certain social 
pressure (Gregorič et al., 2017; Westphal & Graebner, 2010). At the individual level, 
Westphal and colleagues take an employer perspective to further show that certain social 
psychological factors, including interpersonal interaction with recruiting managers and 
directors, and sharing a similar functional background with recruiting directors and 
managers who have higher status can bring an individual additional board appointments 
(Westphal & Shani, 2016; Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007; Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zhu 




However, director selection is a double-sided selection process. Individual 
directors must also accept appointments to achieve final selection outcomes. 
Unfortunately, we do not have enough knowledge about how individual directors select 
their future boards. A major reason for this ignorance is that it is very difficult to obtain 
enough information about how many board options face each director. However, given 
that the final selection outcomes should be approved by individual directors, we should 
to some extent be able to understand how directors select companies by using the final 
matched outcomes.  
To understand how directors select companies, the first issue is why directors 
decide to stay on a board. Management scholars and practitioners have long suggested 
that directors may serve to obtain social capital (Lorsch, 2012; Lorsch & MacIver, 
1989). In partial support of this argument, a recent empirical study shows that directors 
who have board experience and accumulate more social and human capital achieve 
higher prestige, and it becomes easier for them to get promoted to executive roles 
(Boivie et al., 2016b). The research has also shown that affiliating with a prestigious 
company to gain social capital is a major reason for individuals to remain on a board 
(Boivie et al., 2012). Practitioners have claimed that directors can obtain career 
development, networking opportunities, business development, the opportunity to give 
back, supplement their income, and obtain prestige by sitting on boards (Lenkov, 2014). 
Similarly, other research has shown that individuals can join an elite group by serving on 
a board of directors (McDonald & Westphal, 2010; Park & Westphal, 2013; Westphal & 




certain interpersonal interaction behavior, such as flattering to please their managers and 
other directors to gain extra board appointments (Westphal & Stern, 2006, 2007). 
Considering this literature, it seems that gaining social capital is at least one of directors’ 
major considerations when they decide to accept board offers (Lorsch, 2012; Lorsch & 
MacIver, 1989). 
As discussed above, directors may accept board offers to gain social capital; thus, 
the next step in answering director mobility questions (i.e., where do directors go after 
they leave their current board?) is to understand why they leave their current board. The 
existing director exit research has mainly suggested that negative firm events, including 
negative median coverage, financial restatement, and poor firm performance, can lead to 
director exit (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Harrison et al., in press; 
Marcel & Cowen, 2014; Withers et al., 2012a). Although informative, this research only 
focuses on a very special event and thus ignores a more common situation, i.e., directors 
may leave when there is no negative event (Boivie et al., 2012). The research has 
suggested that when there has been no negative event, director exit is mainly voluntary 
and driven by directors’ personal considerations, such as the prestige associated with 
being a director, the ability to gain influence, identification with the director role, time 
commitment, holding other board appointments, and serving as a CEO at another 
company (Boivie et al., 2012). In addition to pursuing personal considerations, directors 
may also leave because of certain constraints. The research has suggested that the major 
challenges of being a director include time constraints and difficulty handling multiple 




have mentioned in their books that time constraints will become a more serious problem 
facing directors in the future because of the increased complexity of corporations and the 
trend of globalization (Lorsch, 2012). To support this argument, the empirical evidence 
has shown that directors become less likely to take seats on multiple boards, especially 
after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 
2009). In sum, directors may be compelled to leave certain boards to pursue other 
personal considerations or to reduce time and other constraints. Incorporating the 
director selection and director exit literature reviewed above, it seems possible that 
directors may drop some board roles to save time and to reduce other constraints to 
better maximize their social capital. 
2.3.2. Tie reconstitution 
Why do individual directors can become eager to accumulate social capital? Social 
network theory suggests that individuals can enjoy network benefits, including access to 
critical resources, information and control power by having network connections or 
occupying certain network structural positions (Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Kleinbaum & 
Stuart, 2013; Li et al., in press; Perry-Smith, 2014; Stam & Elfring, 2008). In addition, 
by having more external ties, individual directors are able to obtain different knowledge 
and perspectives to and thus be able to evolve in firm strategic decision-making 
processes (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Further, social capital has also been shown to 
be related to a director’s future career success (Boivie et al., 2016b). Because of the 
importance of having social capital, individual directors may have the motivation to 




argue above, because directors suffer from time and other constraints that prevent them 
from serving on too many boards, they must pick a new company that can enable them 
to both maintain ties with the prior companies that they have left and maximize new ties 
(Boivie et al., 2016a; Khanna et al., 2014).  
Which company can help a director achieve the purposes stated above? We must 
first understand director exit from a network perspective. From a network perspective, 
director exit represents the fact that the tie between a focal director and his or her prior 
board has been broken if no other ties between the focal director and his or her prior 
board exist. This breaking of ties means that the focal director can no longer leverage the 
resources and information of his or her prior board and can no longer leverage the 
personal human and social capital of other directors on his or her prior board. However, 
if the focal director is able to reconstitute or maintain a tie with at least one director of 
his or her prior board in the context of serving on another board, the focal director may 
still be able to obtain the resources mentioned above by leveraging this indirect tie to his 
or her prior boards and to other directors on that prior board (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; 
Westphal et al., 2006). Given that the value, resources, and social capital associated with 
a prior board tie can be significant and critical (Grosser, Venkataramani, & Labianca, 
2017; Li et al., In press), a focal director can be motivated to reconstitute a broken tie in 
his or her new board to maintain his or her prior network benefits. Partially supporting 
this view, the research has found that managers and directors may choose to reconstitute 
informal friendship ties to manage the firm-level resource dependence and uncertainty 




director is more likely to accept offers from another board that has at least one director 
from his or her prior boards. 
Some may argue for different explanations. For example, a focal director may 
simply be more likely to be selected by a board that has his or her prior board members 
because shared experience makes the focal director more likely be picked by such boards 
(Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zhu & Chen, 2015a; Zhu & Westphal, 2014). In addition, the 
focal director may be recommended by his or her prior board members to the new 
company. However, as I discuss above, director selection is a two-way selection process. 
Being selected by a company does not mean that a focal director is more likely to accept 
that offer. The focal director only accepts an offer when he or she believes that the offer 
is valuable. Therefore, a director’s acceptance of an offer indicates that he or she 
believes the new company can to some extant satisfy his or her personal goals, i.e., 
maintaining or gaining social capital. 
Some may further argue that the focal director may also be more likely to select a 
board with similar others, i.e., members from his or her prior board, because they simply 
prefer co-workers to have a similar background. The existing research seems to support 
this claim by showing that similarity does increase the final matched pairs of boards and 
directors (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zhu & Chen, 2015a; Zhu & Westphal, 2014). 
However, this specific context has reduced this possibility. Given that this study focuses 
on individuals who have left their prior boards in search of improved social capital, they 
must not want to obtain a seat on a board that is too similar to their previous one. The 




Therefore, if a director goes to a new board with directors who are similar to the 
directors of his or her prior board, their decision to exit from their prior board becomes 
meaningless because he or she may not experience much difference in social capital 
(Granovetter, 1973). Conversely, forming relationships with different directors can 
provide heterogenous information that helps to accumulate diversified social capital 
(Burt, 2004; Burt, 2010). The current research either views director exit as involuntary 
due to poor performance or reputational threats or as voluntary due to time and other 
constraints (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Boivie et al., 2012; Daily & Dalton, 1995; Marcel 
& Cowen, 2014). When a director’s exit is because of performance or reputational 
issues, sitting on a new board with previous board colleagues can increase the 
reputational risk because similar board members from poorly performing firms may 
drive the public to stigmatize the new company and their directors because of the 
potential negative reputational spillover (Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012). 
Therefore, a company is less likely to keep multiple directors from companies suffering 
from reputational threats or poor performance.  
In addition, when a director’s exit is because of performance or other reputational 
threats such as a financial crisis, the focal director may want to avoid colleagues from 
the prior fraud company so that he or she can decouple himself or herself from the fraud 
company to protect his or her reputation (Evensky, 2004; Marcel & Cowen, 2014). 
Therefore, when a director’s exit from his or her prior board is because of reputational 
threats facing that company or poor performance, the focal director may become less 




Finally, when a director’s exit is because of time constraints or other personal 
considerations, sitting on a new board with previous board colleagues can easily make 
the old constraints occur again because the members from the prior board may stick to 
shared routines and bring their old practice to the new board (Gilbert, 2005). This can be 
particularly true given that modern boards are facing an increased level of uncertainty 
and complexity (Lorsch, 2012; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). To conclude, similarity 
seeking behavior cannot predict the likelihood of a director to accept a board offer from 
a board that has at least one director from the focal director’s previous board that he or 
she just left. Therefore, the following is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1: After exiting a board, a focal director is more likely to join a board 
that has at least one director from the focal director’s prior board which he or she has 
just left. 
2.3.3. New tie formation 
Reconstituting old ties cannot be the whole story. As I theorize above, directors 
leave their current companies to increase social capital. Reconstituting old ties in another 
company can only retain the exiting social capital but does not help them gain new social 
capital. To gain new social capital, those directors must form new ties. Network ties 
have been shown to significantly affect individuals (Benson, 1975; Burt, 1980a; Ebadi & 
Utterback, 1984; Lincoln & Miller, 1979). For example, the research has found that CEO 
candidates who have relational ties with a current CEO are more likely to be appointed 
as a future CEO (Wiersema et al., 2018). Further, relational embeddedness can also 




In addition, new-tie formation represents an increase in network size. Associated 
with increased network size, there may also be a potential increase in network power and 
status reflected as higher centrality (Bonacich, 1987). The existing network research has 
shown that larger network size and higher centrality can bring a focal node more 
information and control benefits (Ibarra, 1993; Ibarra & Andrews, 1993; Mahmood et 
al., 2011), and focal directors may be able to obtain more network benefits and network 
capital by having a larger network and higher centrality. For example, Geletkanycz, 
Boyd, and Finkelstein (2001) have shown that a CEO’s total number of external director 
ties positively affects CEO compensation. In addition, El-Khatib et al. (2015) suggest 
that high-centrality CEOs can leverage their power and influence to pursue private 
benefits. Therefore, I further argue that leaving directors are more likely to move to 
companies that enable them to establish new ties with individuals who are outside their 
current network (Morrison, 2002).  
Conceptually, accepting any offer from a new company will bring a focal director 
some new network contacts and increase his or her network size, which can increase his 
or her network benefits. However, in reality, the quantity and quality of new ties are 
relevant (Ahuja et al., 2012). The research has suggested that widely connected 
individuals are more able to obtain critical information; build network status; and 
influence other, less connected, partners (Morrison, 2002; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). For a 
director who just left his or her previous board, a necessary issue in addition to 
maintaining his or her previous network is to find a company that can enable him or her 




capital incurred from exiting the prior board, and they can help a focal director to gain 
new social capital and accumulate new resources. Therefore, I first argue that directors 
who have left prior companies are more likely to accept offers from new companies that 
can enable them to form new ties. 
However, the quality of new ties is also important. The research has suggested that 
individuals can successfully leverage indirect ties to collect information and resources 
(Clement et al., 2017; Galunic et al., 2012; Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart, 2001). 
Specifically, connecting to different people is critical in accumulating social capital 
because of the great benefits associated with heterogeneous information, resources and 
capital (Li et al., in press; Paruchuri & Awate, 2017).. Therefore, it may be relatively 
less meaningful for a director to serve on new boards that mainly consist of individuals 
to whom the focal director may be indirectly connected. In addition, the existing 
evidence has shown that network diversity and diversified information and knowledge 
can better help the focal node to improve his or her performance and career (Li et al., in 
press; Paruchuri & Awate, 2017). Building on this argument, I argue that the focal 
director may also try to establish ties with individuals who are not in the focal director’s 
network, i.e., not directly tied or not indirectly tied. By establishing ties with individual 
directors outside his or her current network, the focal director can not only expand his or 
her network but also accumulate diversified and heterogeneous network benefits. 
Therefore, the following is proposed: 
H2: After exiting a board, a focal director is more likely to join a board that has 




2.3.4. The number of existing ties as a network contingency 
There are multiple contingencies that may affect the focal director’s selection of 
his or her future boards (Oehmichen et al., 2017; Tang, Crossan, & Rowe, 2011; 
Westphal & Shani, 2016). Among those contingencies, I explore the impacts of the 
number of existing ties between the focal director and his or her prior board that he or 
she has recently left and the focal director’s gender. I focus on these two contingencies 
because the former represents the network characteristics of the focal director’s prior 
board, and the latter represents the director’s personal attribute. By exploring the 
contingency effect of those two factors, this study can offer an important and more 
complete view to explain how directors select boards to maintain and increase their 
network capital.  
As I discuss above in H1, directors may want to reconstitute a tie with at least one 
member from their prior board to maintain indirect access to the resources and social 
capital of their prior board. However, when a focal director already has multiple indirect 
ties to his or her prior board (i.e., the focal director and some other directors of his or her 
prior board have served on the same board in a third company), the focal director may 
not need to reconstitute a new tie (Westphal et al., 2006). Building new ties with director 
c in another company may not be able to further help b to obtain more information and 
resources; however, it may provide b extra time and support to handle the additional 
board role (Boivie et al., 2016a). Therefore, from a focal director’s perspective, b may 
not want to accept an offer from another company where c serves as a director with all 




focal director and his or her prior board that he or she has left, the focal director may not 
need to accept a board offer from a board that has directors from the focal director’s 
prior board. 
Differently, when there are other ties between a focal director and his or her prior 
board, the individual is more likely to seek new ties. This is because the focal director 
actually does not need to consider maintaining network benefits, and his or her network 
benefits may not decrease by breaking ties with his or her prior board. Actually, by 
breaking ties with his or her prior board, the focal director can gain more available time 
and thus further increase his or her likelihood of serving on another board. When the 
focal director is selecting a board, as I argue in H2, he or she may think more about 
expanding his or her network so that he or she can gain access to diversified information 
and opportunities and increase his or her network power. Therefore, when there are 
multiple other ties between the focal director and his or her prior board that he or she has 
left, the focal director may be more likely to accept a board offer from a board that has 
directors who are outsiders to the focal director’s network. 
H3: The number of existing ties between the focal director and directors of his or 
her prior board will (a) negatively moderate the relationship proposed in H1; and (b) 
positively moderate the relationship proposed in H2. 
2.3.5. Gender as an individual-level contingency 
Gender is widely adopted as a measure to proxy individual risk preference 
(Ragins & Cotton, 1991). Females are in general less likely to pursue risky decisions 




greater female representation engage in fewer acquisitions (Chen et al., 2016). Evidence 
has further shown that females seldom exhibit personalities related to risk-taking 
behaviors (Huang & Kisgen, 2013). In addition, females prefer stable ties and are good 
at building trust to enhance current ties (Charness & Gneezy, 2012; Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007). According to this argument, when a director is female, her risk 
avoidance may make her more likely to reconstitute broken ties because tie 
reconstitution can reduce the risk of her exit decision and help her to maintain a stable 
relationship. Therefore, the following is proposed: 
H4: Being female will positively affect H1; that is, after exiting a board, a female 
director compared to a male director is more likely to accept board offers from boards 
that have at least one director from the focal director’s prior board that she has just left. 
Differently put, establishing ties with individuals completely outsider her 
network may be a risky decision for female directors. The research on tie formation has 
suggested that both individuals and companies prefer to build ties with familiar 
colleagues to reduce uncertainty (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Zhu & Chen, 2015a; Zhu & 
Westphal, 2014). For example, (Boone, van Olffen, van Witteloostuijn, & de Brabander, 
2004) showed that top management teams prefer to select similar managers and may 
only select diversified members when they face poor performance and other 
environmental constraints. Establishing ties with a network outsider can produce 
unpredictable outcomes (van Dijk, Meyer, van Engen, & Loyd, 2017). For example, 
Ahuja (2000) showed that too much diversified information may lead to absorption 




communicating and socializing, their risk aversion personality may prevent them from 
accepting offers from companies that are full of strangers. As a result, the following is 
proposed: 
 H5: Being female will negatively affect H2; that is, after exiting a board, a 
female director compared to a male director is less likely to accept board offers from a 




3.1. Data and Sample 
To construct the director-level network for study 1 and study 2, I collected data 
on directors, boards and CEOs of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 1500 companies from 2010 
to 2017. I gathered data mainly from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), Compustat 
Executive Compensation (Execucomp), and COMPUSTAT databases. The final samples 
for study 1 and study 2 are at the director-year level. After accounting for time lags, I 
obtained 76,932 director-year observations for 17,919 directors in study 1, and 78,170 
director -year observations for 18,013 directors in study 2. 
To construct the bipartite network for study 3, I collected data on directors, 
boards, CEOs and company characteristics of Fortune 100 companies between 2013 to 
2016. Similarly, data has been collected from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 
Compustat Executive Compensation (Execucomp), and COMPUSTAT databases. After 
removing companies which are not consistent in the Fortune 100 list from 2013-2016, I 
obtained a final a sample of 1076 directors and 75 firms for 4 consistent years. 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Dependent variables  
New tie formation. In study 1, I use a binary variable, new tie formation, to 
capture whether the focal director gets an additional board appointment. This variable is 
coded as 1 if a new combination of director ID and company ID is captured in the 




Tie dissolution. In study 2, I create a binary variable, tie dissolution, to capture 
whether the focal director dissolves any existing tie. This variable is 1 if an existing 
combination of director ID and company ID no longer exists in the following year, and 0 
otherwise. 
Director company tie matrix. To test Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3a, and 
Hypothesis 4 in study 3, I created a director-company level matrix to reflect the network 
tie of each director-company pair. If there is a tie between a director and a company, the 
matrix unit is 1. 
Director company tie matrix for directors who have a tie dissolution. To test 
Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3b, and Hypothesis 5 in study 3, I adopted another director-
company level matrix to reflect the network tie of each director who has experienced a 
tie dissolution in the prior year and company pair. If there is a tie between a director who 
has experienced a tie dissolution in the prior year and a company, the matrix unit is 1. 
3.2.2. Independent variables  
Brokerage. I used Burt’s structural holes measure to assess brokerage. Structural 
holes refer to the absence of a link between two contacts who are both linked to an actor 
(Burt, 1992). The constraint measure from (Burt, 1992) reflects the actor's lack of access 
to structural holes. High constraint indicates that a firm’s contacts are densely connected 
with high redundancy in information flow. Work ties were used to represent network ties 
for calculating structural holes. If a director works for a company, there are ties between 
the focal director and other directors of that company. I then calculated constraint in R 





Where  is the proportion of the actor i's ties invested in connection with firm j, 
and  is the sum of the indirect tie from firm i to firm j via all firms q. As this 
formula yields a measure that has higher values indicative of greater constraint (i.e., 
fewer structural holes), I use 1 - constraint to capture brokerage. Director’s access to 
structural holes are my independent variables in both study 1 and study 2. I also adopted 
recruiting firm’s access to structural holes 1 as a moderating variable, and exited firm’s 
access to structural holes in study 2 as a moderating variable.  
Centrality. Network centrality refers to the extent to which an actor occupies a 
central position in a network (Freeman, 1979; Freeman, Roeder, & Mulholland, 1979). It 
reflects that actor’s importance in the network (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003) and implies a high 
position in a status hierarchy as well as a high degree of access to and control of valuable 
resources (Brass, 1984). I used the eigenvector centrality, which captures not only the 
connectedness of the focal actor but also the connectedness of its contacts (Bonacich, 
1987). Individual directors and firms can obtain higher eigenvector centrality by being 
connected to a group of contacts that have many well-connected, powerful contacts of 
their own (Koka & Prescott, 2008; Podolny, 2001). Director’s eigenvector centrality in 




Further, I adopted the recruiting firm’s eigenvector centrality in study 1 as a 
moderating variable and the exiting firm’s eigenvector centrality in study 2 as a 
moderating variable. 
Indirect tie dissolution matrix. To test Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3a, and 
Hypothesis 4 in study 3, I created an indirect tie dissolution matrix. If there was a 
dissolution of an indirect tie between a director and a company, I coded it as 1; otherwise 
it was 0. Figure 1 shows the logic for using the indirect tie dissolution in predicting 
director-company tie formation. 
Network outsider ratio matrix. To test Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 3b, and 
Hypothesis 5 in study 3, I calculated the network outsider ratio matrix. Each unit of the 
matrix was measured as the ratio between the total number of directors in the focal 
director’s new company who were second order network outsiders to the focal director, 
and the board size of this new company. 
To account for reversal causality, I lagged all my independent variables for a 
year. 
3.2.3. Moderating variables 
Gender. Gender is operationalized as a binary variable. If the focal director is 
female, this variable is 1, and 0 otherwise. This measure is to be consistently used from 
study 1 to study 3. 
Firm performance. A director’s current firm performance was measured as the 
return on assets (ROA) of the single highest performing firm to which a director is 




attracted by an individual’s best performance. This measure was adopted in both study 1 
and study 2. 
Number of Existing Ties (i.e. existing ties). This variable was calculated as the 
total number of indirect director-company ties owned by the focal director. I counted the 
total number of indirect pathways through which a focal director can connect to firms. 
3.2.4. Control variables 
For study 1 and 2, I control for a number of potentially confounding factors at 
various levels of analysis. At the industry level, I control for industry median 
performance measured by industry median ROA. As for characteristics of firms which 
directors serve on, I control for the single largest firm size measured by the log of total 
employees, organizational slack, and R&D intensity of all firms in which the focal 
director serves. For board characteristics, the average of board total independent 
directors, female directors and board average external appointments of all boards on 
which the focal director serves are also controlled. Further, the average of the CEO 
tenure and CEO compensation of all firms in which the focal director serves are also 
controlled. Finally, at director level, I controlled for director tenure and director age.  
For study 3, I controlled for firm performance measured by ROA, firm centrality, 
firm size, and CEO duality at the firm level. I also controlled for director age at director 
level. For network structures, I controlled for network density. Rate parameters were 






3.2.5. Analytical strategies 
For both study 1 and study 2, I use multiple failure event history analysis, which 
is designed for use in modeling "time to event" data when either of two or more events 
(failures) occur for the same subject (Beck & Katz, 2004). Multiple failures event history 
analysis is particularly suitable for my context because either director selection or 
director exit can happen several times to a single person within the observation period. 
Further, the event history analysis is suitable here because the survival time in at either 
director selection or director exit context is often "right-censored", meaning that the 
study period may end before the event of interest occurs (Morita, Lee, & Mowday, 
1993). Right-censoring is not a concern for event-history methods. I used Stata 14 to run 
regressions in study 1 and study 2. I will use the observation year as the time variable 
and individual-firm code as the individual-firm level classification variable. The year 
2010 is set as the enter time of the multiple failure models. 
I use RSIENA to run stochastic actor-oriented models (SOAM) for study 3. 
SOAM is a technique that uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MCMC-MLE) to model network dynamics and evolution (Snijders, 2005). 
This approach enables me to model tie interdependence across the director interlock 
network, appropriately capture the time-based nature of network tie formation through 
longitudinal analysis, and test whether the hypothesized effects of director mobility 
persist when analyzed in the broader network context. RSIENA is so far the only 
available package to run longitudinal SOAM, and it is well adopted by previous research 





4.1. Results for Study 1 
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients of all 
hypothesized and control variables in study 1. The maximum VIF was 1.85, far less than 
the recommended ceiling of 5 (Bagheri & Midi, 2009; Montgomery, Peck, & Vining, 
2012). Multicollinearity does not appear to be a problem. 
Event history analysis results are reported in Table 2. Model 1 presents the base 
model on director selection with control variables. Model 2 presents the main effects of 
individual director’s centrality and brokerage on director selection. Model 3 provides the 
main effect with the control of both firm performance and director gender, and Model 4 
reports the moderation effect of gender and firm performance.  
 As expected, Model 2 shows a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between a focal director’s brokerage and director selection (b = 4.718, p= 0.000), which 
supports Hypothesis 2. However, there is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between the focal director’s centrality and director selection (b = -0.090, p= 
0.034), which is opposite to Hypothesis 1. This result may be caused by network 
embeddedness, which I discuss further in the discussion section.  
Model 3 shows the main effect with the control of gender and average home firm 
performance. Consistent with my theory, gender has a positive and statistically 
significant relationship with director selection (b = 0.198, p= 0.003), suggesting that 
female directors are in general more popular in the director labor market. Home firm 




selection (b = -0.709, p= 0.001), suggesting that directors from good performing firms 
are less likely to gain additional board appointments. This may be explained by the fact 
that good performing firms require a higher level of director engagement, which reduces 
the likelihood of the focal director accepting an additional board offer.  
Model 4 tests the moderation effect of gender and average home firm 
performance. Surprisingly, gender has a negative moderation effect on both director’s 
brokerage and director’s centrality (b = -0.709, p= 0.001), meaning that a female director 
who is more central in her network or who has more brokerage positions is less likely to 
gain an additional board appointment, compared to her male colleagues who occupy the 
similar network position. These results are opposite to my Hypotheses. I further discuss 
this outcome in the discussion section. 
Model 5 shows the main effects of firm brokerage and firm centrality on director 
selection. I tested those Hypotheses separately because Hypothesis 7-Hypothesis 10 only 
apply to directors who have gained additional appointments in the observing year. 
Therefore, this is a sub-sample of my original sample. Model 6 suggests that recruiting 
firm’s centrality negatively and significantly moderate the relationship between director 
centrality and director selection (b=-27.101, p=0.038), supporting Hypothesis 7. 
However, recruiting firm’s centrality does not have a statistically significant moderation 
effect on the relationship between individual brokerage and director selection (b=-0.094, 
p=0.770), failing to support Hypothesis 8. Further, recruiting firm’s brokerage positively 




p=0.038), and the relationship between director brokerage and director selection 
(b=0.055, p=0.028), thus supporting Hypothesis 9 and Hypothesis 10.  
The overall Hypothesis testing results are shown in Table 3. 
4.2. Results for Study 2 
Table 4 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients of all 
hypothesized and control variables in study 2.  
Event history analysis results are reported in Table 5. Model 1 presents the base 
model on director exit with control variables. Model 2 presents the main effects of 
individual director’s centrality and brokerage on director exit. Model 3 provides the 
main effect with the control of both firm performance and director gender, and Model 4 
reports the moderation effects of gender and firm performance.  
 As expected, Model 2 shows a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between a focal director’s brokerage and director exit (b=2.289, p=0.000), which 
supports Hypothesis 1 of study 2. However, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the focal director’s centrality and director exit (b=0.605, p=0.639), 
failing to support Hypothesis 2. Model 3 shows the main effect with the control of 
gender and average firm performance. Consistent with my theory, gender has a negative 
and statistically significant relationship with director exit (b=-0,074, p=0,007), 
suggesting that female directors are in general less likely to exit from a current firm. The 
home firm performance also has a negative and statistically significant relationship with 
director exit (b=-0.497, p=0.000), suggesting that directors are less likely to leave a good 




Model 4 tests the moderation effect of gender and maximized firm performance. 
However, I fail to find the significant moderation effects of gender on the relationship 
between director’s brokerage and director exit (b=0.089, b=0.698), and on the 
relationship between director’s centrality and director exit (b=2.031, b=0.726), meaning 
that there is no statistically significant difference between a female director who is more 
central in her network or who has more brokerage position and a male colleague who 
occupies the similar network position. These results fail to support both Hypotheses 3 
and Hypothesis 4. In addition, Model 4 also suggests that there is a negative but 
statistically insignificant moderation effect of maximized firm performance on the 
relationship between director centrality and director exit (b=89.388, b=0.373), failing to 
support Hypothesis 6. Further, maximized firm performance has a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between director brokerage and director exit 
(b=2.551, p=0.000), which is opposite of Hypothesis 5. This result suggests that when 
the director’s maximized firm performance is higher, the director is more likely to exit 
from an existing company. I will further discuss this finding in the discussion section 
below. 
To test Hypothesis 7-Hypothesis 10, I have Model 5 to show the moderation 
effects of firm brokerage and firm centrality on director exit. Similar to what I’ve done 
in study 1, I also tested those Hypotheses separately because Hypothesis 7-Hypothesis 
10 only apply to directors who have exited from a company in the observing years. 
Therefore, this is a sub-sample of my original sample in study 2. Model 6 suggests that 




between director brokerage and director exit (b=3.864, p=0.042), supporting Hypothesis 
9. However, recruiting firm’s centrality does not have a statistically significant 
moderation effect on the relationship between individual centrality and director exit 
(b=6.701, p=0.786), and the relationship between individual brokerage and director exit 
(b=0.431, p=0.174), failing to support both Hypothesis 7 and Hypothesis 8. Further, I 
cannot find a significant moderation effect of recruiting firm’s brokerage on the 
relationship between director centrality and director selection (b=-4.830, p=0.965), 
failing to support Hypothesis 10. 
The overall Hypothesis testing results for study 2 are shown in Table 6. 
4.3. Results for Study 3 
To apply the stochastic modeling approach, I first checked the changes in 
network ties between two consecutive waves of observation. The Jaccard index (Jaccard, 
1900) for my sample was 0.462 and 0.431, which were all greater than the 0.3. 
Therefore, my sample satisfies the assumptions of stochastic network evolution 
(Snijders, Van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). 
Table 7 shows the results of Siena for Hypothesis 1, 3a, and Hypothesis 4, with a 
dependent variable of new tie formation. Siena models require the t-ratios less than 0.25 
for the overall model and less than 0.1 for model predictors (Snijders, Steglich, & van de 
Bunt, 2008) to achieve convergence. All my models meet this convergence requirement. 
Model 1 is the base model with control variables.  
Model 2 shows the main effect of an indirect tie dissolution between a focal 




moderation effect of gender and redundant indirect ties owned by the focal director. The 
network structural term, network density, is consistently significant from Model 1 to 
Model 3 in predicting changes in director-company tie formation, suggesting that some 
of the observed network changes are caused by underlying social processes associated 
with density. This result further confirms the existence of network interdependence in 
my sample, and thus supports the selection of stochastic modeling approach. 
As Model 2 suggests, the relationship between dissolution of indirect tie between 
the focal director and the recruiting company and the new tie formation between the 
focal director and the recruiting company is insignificant (b=-0.259, p>0.1), and thus 
fails to support Hypothesis 1. In Model 3, neither being female (b=2.557, p>0.1) or 
redundant tie (b=1.496, p>0.1) moderates the proposed main effect. Therefore, I do not 
find support for Hypothesis 3a, and Hypothesis 4. 
Further, Table 8 shows the hypothesis testing results for Hypothesis 2, 
Hypothesis 3b, and Hypothesis 5, with a dependent variable of new tie formation after 
tie dissolution. Model 1 is the base model with control variables. Model 2 shows the 
main effect of network outsider ratio in the recruiting company, and Model 3 shows the 
full model, considering the moderation effect of gender and redundant indirect ties 
owned by the focal director. The network structural term, network density, again, is 
consistently statistically significant from Model 1 to Model 3 in predicting changes in 
director-company tie formation. 
As Model 2 suggests, the network outsider ratio between the focal director and 




between the focal director and the recruiting company after a tie dissolution happening 
to the focal director (b=-4.700, p<0.001). Interestingly, this result opposite of that 
proposed in Hypothesis 2, and may suggest another movement mechanism, which I will 
discuss further in the discussion section. In Model 3, being female has a positive 
moderation effect on new tie formation (b=0.669, p<0.01), suggesting that females are 
actually more likely to go to companies with more network outsiders. However, 
redundant ties do not moderate the proposed main effect (b=-3.111, p>0.1). Therefore, I 
do not find support for Hypothesis 3b, and Hypothesis 5. 





5.1. Director Mobility 
The three studies that comprise my dissertation provide some broad insights into 
director mobility, from both the firm/market perspective, and the individual perspective. 
Study 1 shows that firms select their outside directors by considering the individual level 
network structural positions, including both network brokerage and network centrality. 
However, the results contradict my expectation that more central directors may actually 
be less likely to gain additional board appointments. This may be caused by multiple 
reasons. First of all, firms may not want an over-central person on board. As I discussed 
earlier, network centrality represents network status and power. Although additional 
status and power can help a focal firm in a variety of ways, it may also change the 
current power dynamics on boards. For example, the addition of a powerful director may 
reduce the CEO power relative to the board power. Or similarly, introducing a powerful 
outsider director may challenge the existing power and status of the board current chair, 
or other directors. Therefore, to maintain a stable power dynamic and to protect personal 
interests, recruiting boards may choose not to have a central person.  
Second, a central director may not want to accept additional board offers. 
Research has argued that directors are sitting on boards to gain power, status, network 
connections, for further promotions and other benefits (Boivie et al., 2016b). However, 
as a central person in the director network, the focal director may be satisfied with 
his/her current power, status and connections. In addition, being a central person in a 




flows and maintain relationships. Given that each individual will have a limited resource 
and time, the focal individual may not be able to accept additional job offers. 
Further, network embeddedness research has suggested that individuals may 
suffer from network inertia which prevents them from changing the current network 
position (Kim et al., 2006). Building on the research of organizational inertia, research in 
network embeddedness suggests that individuals may become path dependent, and thus 
become less open to changes (Li & Rowley, 2002). As a result, a central director may 
want to stay within his/her current network with a reduced willingness to consider 
additional possibilities.  
Moreover, study 1 also suggests that being a network broker can help individuals 
gain more additional board appointments. As I discussed earlier, firms prefer network 
brokers who can provide information benefits with minimum information redundancy. 
Firms with network brokerage don’t need to overthink about the change of their power 
dynamics because brokerage cannot represent the overall network power and status. 
From an individual perspective, network brokers can be more informed compared to 
other people, given the amount of non-redundant heterogenous information they can 
receive. Network brokers may also suffer less from network inertia and path dependence 
because when absorbing heterogenous and diversified information, the focal directors 
can develop a more innovative and diversified perspective, and thus are less likely to 
limit themselves to a fixed pattern.  
Study 2 shows that directors who have more network brokerages may be more 




directors to receive more diversified information and thus be able to learn about other 
board opportunities which may be able to better satisfy their personal and career goals. 
Given their limited time and availability, they have to exit from the focal company. 
However, central directors, surprisingly, are less likely to exit from existing companies. 
Some may think this is because central directors’ network connections mainly come 
from their firms. Leaving their current firms may lead to a reduction of their centrality. 
However, given that the empirical results fail to support Hypothesis 8, and fail to find 
any significant relationship between firm centrality and director exit, the likelihood of 
this explanation is reduced. Another possible explanation is based on the network 
embeddedness and network inertia argument. Because central directors have higher 
network embeddedness, which also contributes to a higher level of network inertia, it is 
harder for them to break existing ties. This inertial effect may cancel the positive 
relationship between centrality and director exit based on information benefits, and thus 
contribute to a negative but non-significant result. 
Study 3 further supports the network embeddedness and inertial argument by 
showing a negative relationship between network outsider ratio and director company 
tie-formation. As I discussed earlier, when a director tries to maximize his/her network 
connections and gain network capital and power, the most efficient way is to establish 
ties with people outside his/her network. However, the results suggest that directors are 
not that rational. They are more likely to choose to stay within the circle of familiar 
people. Moreover, the failure to find support for Hypothesis 3a suggests that even when 




companies and network, they still won’t choose to go to companies which may bring 
them new network partners. This further supports the notion that network inertia based 
on a high level of network embeddedness affectdirector’s mobility decisions. 
Study 3 provides some other interesting perspectives. Failing to support 
Hypothesis 1 suggests that indirect tie dissolution between a focal director and a 
company does not increase the likelihood for the director to go to that firm. From a 
company’s perspective, the dissolution of an indirect tie to an individual may not change 
the network relationship when there is no big change in the company level network. 
From a director’s perspective, there are also two possibilities. First, my study only 
considers formal interlock ties. However, the informal friendship tie may not break when 
the formal tie dissolves. Therefore, the focal director may still be able to obtain the same 
benefits through informal ties. Second, although research suggests that indirect ties can 
provide network benefits, directors may not realize such benefits. As a result, the focal 
directors may choose other ways to directly connect back to their old networks to reduce 
loss instead of establishing indirect ties. 
5.2. Female Directors 
Research on female directors mainly suggests that women are underrepresented 
on boards (Chen et al., 2016; Gregorič et al., 2017). Given the fact that female directors 
have been associated with higher legitimacy, and better performance, female directors 
should be more popular on the director labor market. Study 1 confirms this argument by 
finding that being female has a positive main effect on director selection. However, I fail 




to suggest that among directors who occupy a superior network position, being female 
does not increase their likelihood to gain additional board appointment. Further, being 
female negatively moderates the relationship between director’s brokerage and director 
selection, suggesting that compared to their male colleagues having similar 
characteristics, female directors who occupy a position with more brokerage are less 
likely to have additional board seats. This result may indicate that although boards try to 
hire female directors, when considering network benefits, male directors are more 
preferred. Relatedly, through simulations, Martell, Emrich, and Robison-Cox (2012) 
have found that females can hardly be higher in the hierarchy due to the accumulation of 
discrimination at each level in the hierarchy.  
In addition, women are believed to be more conservative and prefer stable 
environments. My study 2 further supports this by finding a negative main effect of 
being female and director exit. The main effects of being female in study 3 are shown in 
Model 4 and Model 5 which also confirm this conclusion.  
Moreover, results in study 3 suggest that after an exit, female directors are more 
likely to go to companies which have a higher network outsider ratio, suggesting that 
once female directors decide to leave, they focus more on expanding their network. 
Integrating this finding with the results discussed above, it may be the case that female 
directors are more willing to invest the time to establish network capital. 
5.3. Firm Level Contingencies on Director Mobility 
In this dissertation, I also explored the effect of firm level characteristics on 




suggesting that directors carefully plan their exit and are thus less likely to leave a firm 
with good performance because high-performing firms may help directors establish their 
reputation and status. Further, directors’ current high firm performance also reduces the 
likelihood for an individual director to gain additional board appointment, confirming 
the assumption that I made earlier that directors only have very limited time and 
resources and thus can only focus on a few board roles. High performing companies may 
require more engagement and thus reduce the possibility for a director to hold an 
additional board appointment. Therefore, for directors, staying on board of a good 
performing firm on the one hand can help them increase their reputation and status; 
however, on the other hand, it may also decrease their chances to expand their network. 
Further, companies’ network positions, including centrality and brokerage, can 
also have very distinct effects. In general, companies which have greater brokerage are 
more willing to have directors with superior network positions. However, companies 
which have higher network structural power appear to be only open to directors who 
have more brokerage do not recruit directors who have higher network power. This 
finding can be viewed as evidence of network embeddedness and inertia at the board 
level. Boards of central companies want to maintain the existing network power dynamic 
and thus choose not to bring in another powerful person who may challenge the current 
balance. Similarly, boards of companies with brokerage positions are more open to 







My dissertation research makes several contributions. First, this dissertation tries 
to provide a relatively complete view of director selection by considering director 
selection from both the firm and the individual perspective. From a firm perspective, 
study 1 demonstrates that firms select directors by considering their network superior 
positions, including brokerage position and network centrality position, thus combining 
director selection research with structural network theory. Further, my study suggests 
that central directors are less attractive to selecting firms, suggesting the need for a 
combined consideration of network embeddedness and board power dynamics in the 
director selection. Especially, study 3 complements study 1 at a network dyadic level 
from an individual perspective. Although failing to find support for the director’s 
motivation to pursue social capital, study 3 has shown that directors are locked into their 
existing network and rarely go beyond their current network to establish brand new 
connections. This further supports the network embedded view, and thus contributes to 
our understanding of director selection at a more micro level. 
From an individual perspective, this dissertation also contributes to director exit 
research by introducing the structural network perspective into the director exit 
literature. Given that director exit remains understudied, this dissertation enriches our 
current knowledge about director exit in general by adding network positions as 
antecedents to director exit. More specific, this dissertation further illustrates that 




decision-making process, thus enriching our understanding of directors’ decision making 
from a network behavior perspective. Especially by showing that directors who have 
more network brokerage position are more likely to leave their current company, my 
study further supports the view that director exits are more likely to be voluntary. In 
addition, this dissertation further discloses a negative relationship between a director’s 
network centrality and exit from the board, further supporting the director network 
embeddedness argument, and showing that network embeddedness can prevent directors 
from getting additional new appointments but also from exiting from the current 
companies. This conclusion provides further insights into director exit research.  
Moreover, this dissertation has examined a number of individual and firm level 
contingencies, which can further contribute to our understanding of director selection, 
director exit, and corporate governance. First, my dissertation discussed the labor market 
condition for female directors, and thus contributing to the board diversity literature. The 
results in study 1 and study 2 support existing research that female directors are more 
popular on the director labor market, and they are also more conservative and thus 
hesitate to leave their current company, adding evidence to the gender diversity 
literature. In addition, empirical results from study 3 also shows that after exiting a 
current company, a female director is more likely to expand her network by going to a 
company which has a higher network outsider ratio, suggesting that female directors 
may be more likely to take additional risk after experiencing a recent change, and thus 
enrich our understanding of director behavior and decision making. Further, although 




central  (Chu & Davis, 2016), my results suggest that females who are network brokers 
less likely to gain an additional board appointment, suggesting a possibility of unequal 
treatment of female directors. Although no solid conclusion on this topic can be made 
based on existing results, my research suggests the need for future research on the labor 
market experience of female directors. 
This dissertation also shows that recruiting companies evaluate directors, 
including those who have superior network positions, based on firm performance. 
Directors in general may be aware of this evaluation standard and thus are less likely to 
exit from good performing firms. Only director who enjoy network brokerage benefits 
are more likely to exit from existing companies when his/her current firm performance is 
high. This result contributes to the performance evaluation, especially director 
evaluation research by providing direct evidence about the relationship between 
directors’ firm performance and director selection, and director exit, especially for 
directors who have superior network positions. 
Further, my dissertation contributes to the social network literature by showing 
how firm level network positions interact with individual level network positions to 
affect director selection and exit. Specifically, central recruiting firms are less likely to 
recruit central directors, suggesting a substitution effect between firm centrality and 
individual centrality on director selection. Recruiting firms with more network brokerage 
tend to be more willing to hire directors who have higher network centrality or more 
brokerage, suggesting a complementarity between firm brokerage and individual 




with more brokerage. These results go beyond the existing network literature by showing 
the dynamics among different networks at different levels, and thus enrich our 
understanding of network evolution and interactions. 
Finally, this research provides empirical contributions to both the social network 
literature and governance literature by modeling director mobility at a dyadic level. By 
adopting the longitudinal stochastic modeling approach in study 3, this dissertation also 
provides a more accurate view of where directors move when they exit from previous 
boards, thus laying the micro-foundation of the network effect on director mobility. 
6.2. Limitation and Future Directions 
While I have attempted to empirically examine the relationship between network 
structure positions and director mobility from a firm and individual perspective, my 
dissertation only observes limited network positions and process underlying director-
company tie formation and dissolution. Therefore, some other network factors and 
processes may also play a role in the director mobility process. For example, network 
clusters may be another structural factor which can affect director mobility, especially 
that this dissertation suggested a salient effect of network embeddedness. Further, 
relational embeddedness, such as network tie strength and private relationships, can also 
be factors to affect director mobility. As such, more research is needed to provide a 
broader picture of the director mobility. 
My dissertation found network embeddedness and an inertial effect in the 
director mobility process. However, to make a solid conclusion about how network 




explore the relevant mechanism(s). for example, qualitative studies employing survey 
and interviews can better show feelings and thoughts of individual directors, thus better 
exploring the nature of network embeddedness. Further, my dissertation results also 
suggest some possibility of potential mistreatment of female directors who occupy a 
superior network position. To better examine whether the mistreatment exits and how it 
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FIGURE 1 Hypothesis 1 (Study 3) Operationalization 
 
 
Operationalization logic: When director a leaves company F at time 1, the 
indirect tie between a and company G through director b dissolves. In Hypothesis 1, I 
argue that a tends to reconstitute this broken tie by coming to G, and thus the indirect tie 







TABLE 1. Correlations and Descriptive Statistics of Study 1 
 Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Additional board 
appointment 
0.049 0.216 1.000        
           
2.Director's centrality 0.001 0.010 -0.010 1.000       
           
3.Director's brokerage 0.661 0.133 0.110 0.085 1.000      
           
4.Appointing firm's centrality 0.013 0.025 0.098 -0.022 0.462 1.000     
           
5.Appointing firm's brokerage 0.656 0.313 0.033 -0.030 0.155 0.266 1.000    
           
6.Gender 0.144 0.351 0.041 -0.011 0.098 0.055 0.010 1.000   
           
7.Current firm performance 0.051 0.092 0.015 -0.014 0.109 0.087 0.036 0.019 1.000  
           
8.Current industry median 
ROA 
0.046 0.048 0.016 -0.009 -0.032 0.050 0.012 0.009 0.554 1.000 
           
9.Current firm size 2.184 1.376 0.090 -0.033 0.546 0.555 0.189 0.089 0.179 0.145 
           
10.Current firm slack 0.088 1.449 0.019 0.077 0.122 0.307 0.081 0.009 0.118 0.047 
           
11.Current firm R&D 
intensity 






TABLE 1. (Continued) 
 Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
           
12.Total independent 
directors in the current 
company 
7.905 2.322 0.051 0.372 0.661 0.387 0.169 0.082 -0.020 -0.108 
           
13.Total female directors in 
the current company 
1.516 1.086 0.062 0.033 0.457 0.378 0.136 0.281 0.047 -0.002 
           
14.Total board appointments 
of the current company 
13.549 4.793 0.087 0.214 0.806 0.659 0.267 0.086 0.067 -0.018 
           
15.CEO compensation of the 
current firms 
8.401 1.005 0.077 0.017 0.363 0.353 0.123 0.056 0.096 0.039 
           
16.CEO tenure of the current 
firms 
7.871 7.237 -0.052 -0.029 -0.153 -0.079 -0.012 -0.034 0.010 -0.006 
           
17.Director age 62.780 10.843 -0.028 -0.003 0.027 -0.001 0.025 -0.117 -0.004 -0.026 
           







TABLE 1. (Continued) 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
9.Current firm size 1.000          
           
10.Current firm slack 0.190 1.000         
           
11.Current firm R&D 
intensity 
-0.070 0.174 1.000        
12.Total independent 
directors in the current 
company 
0.351 0.085 -0.069 1.000       
           
13.Total female directors in 
the current company 
0.380 0.068 -0.053 0.510 1.000      
           
14.Total board appointments 
of the current company 
0.571 0.164 -0.054 0.774 0.514 1.000     
           
15.CEO compensation of the 
current firms 
0.447 0.059 0.007 0.308 0.270 0.428 1.000    
           
16.CEO tenure of the current 
firms 
-0.092 0.011 0.013 -0.138 -0.123 -0.137 -0.095 1.000   
           
17.Director age 0.014 0.013 -0.011 0.021 -0.038 0.018 0.002 0.071 1.000  
           





TABLE 2. Multi-Failure Event History Analysis Results of Study 1 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Current industry median ROA 0.332 1.062* 1.793*** 2.119*** 3.824 3.935 
 (0.456) (0.552) (0.607) (0.628) (2.790) (2.815) 
 [0.466] [0.055] [0.003] [0.001] [0.170] [0.162] 
       
Current firm size 0.128*** 0.015 0.014 0.022 0.013 0.012 
 (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.058) (0.059) 
 [0.000] [0.503] [0.511] [0.321] [0.820] [0.842] 
       
Current firm slack -0.024 -0.015 -0.011 -0.007 0.004 0.006 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.033) (0.033) 
 [0.119] [0.348] [0.484] [0.638] [0.910] [0.868] 
       
Current firm R&D intensity 0.223 -0.179 -0.240 -0.115 -0.284 -0.242 
 (0.147) (0.203) (0.198) (0.203) (0.457) (0.481) 
 [0.130] [0.379] [0.227] [0.571] [0.535] [0.615] 
       
Total independent directors in the current company -0.013 0.005 0.007 0.001 0.007 0.014 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.055) (0.055) 
 [0.341] [0.753] [0.683] [0.934] [0.900] [0.807] 
       
Total female directors in the current company 0.013 0.009 -0.014 -0.016 -0.042 -0.039 
 (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.071) (0.070) 
 [0.609] [0.717] [0.574] [0.528] [0.552] [0.583] 
       
Total board appointments of the current company 0.042*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.066** -0.080** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.032) (0.033) 




TABLE 2. (Continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
CEO compensation of the current firms 0.151*** 0.186*** 0.192*** 0.187*** -0.043 -0.042 
 (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.055) (0.055) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.432] [0.444] 
       
CEO tenure of the current firms -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.013 -0.013 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.012) (0.012) 
 [0.000] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.262] [0.286] 
       
Director age -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) 
 [0.720] [0.598] [0.654] [0.653] [0.289] [0.326] 
       
Director tenure -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.054*** -0.053*** -0.055*** -0.057*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
Director's centrality  -0.090** -0.092** -0.159*** -27.017 -464.126* 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.037) (18.428) (246.735) 
  [0.034] [0.030] [0.000] [0.143] [0.060] 
       
Director's brokerage  4.718*** 4.804*** 5.269*** 8.127*** 8.215*** 
  (0.289) (0.303) (0.321) (0.891) (0.894) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
Gender   0.198*** 0.162 0.141 0.145 
   (0.067) (0.105) (0.133) (0.133) 
   [0.003] [0.124] [0.289] [0.277] 




TABLE 2. (Continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Current firm performance   -0.709*** -0.588** -2.655*** -2.782*** 
   (0.220) (0.295) (0.837) (0.857) 
   [0.001] [0.046] [0.002] [0.001] 
       
Current firm performance*Director's centrality    -2.489**   
    (1.221)   
    [0.042]   
       
Current firm performance*Director's brokerage    -0.890*   
    (0.458)   
    [0.052]   
       
Gender *Director's centrality    -2.425   
    (1.639)   
    [0.139]   
       
Gender *Director's brokerage    -11.834***   
    (2.230)   
    [0.000]   
       
Appointing firm's centrality     0.044** -1.347** 
     (0.020) (0.541) 
     [0.026] [0.013] 
       
Appointing firm's brokerage     0.005 1.319** 
     (0.004) (0.634) 
     [0.155] [0.038] 










 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Appointing firm's centrality*Director's centrality      -27.101*** 
      (10.145) 
      [0.008] 
       
Appointing firm's centrality*Director's brokerage      -0.094 
      (0.322) 
      [0.770] 
       
Appointing firm's brokerage*Director's centrality      25.347** 
      (12.192) 
      [0.038] 
       
Appointing firm's brokerage*Director's brokerage      0.055** 
      (0.025) 
      [0.028] 
       
Observations 54,292 54,292 54,292 54,292 4,294 4,294 




TABLE 3. Hypotheses Testing Results of Study 1 
Hypothesis Proposed Effect Empirical Result 
H1 
Director’s individual centrality is positively associated with his or her 
possibility of obtaining subsequent additional board appointments 
Negative and significant 
   
H2 
Director’s individual brokerage is positively associated with his or her 
possibility of obtaining subsequent additional board appointments 
Supported 
   
H3 Being female positively moderates the relationship in H1 Not significant 
   
H4 Being female positively moderates the relationship in H2 Negative and significant 
   
H5 
A director’s current firm performance positively moderates the 
relationship in H1 
Negative and significant 
   
H6 
A director’s current firm performance positively moderates the 
relationship in H2 
Negative and significant 
   
H7 
A recruiting firm’s centrality negatively moderates the relationship in 
H1 
Supported 
   
H8 
A recruiting firm’s centrality positively moderates the relationship in 
H2 
Not significant 
   
H9 
A recruiting firm’s brokerage positively moderates the relationship in 
H2 
Supported 
   
H10 






TABLE 4. Correlations and Descriptive Statistics of Study 2 
 Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1.Director exit 0.181 0.385 1.000        
           
2.Director's centrality 0.001 0.010 -0.006 1.000       
           
3.Director's brokerage 0.661 0.133 0.056 0.085 1.000      
           
4.Exiting firm's centrality 0.013 0.024 -0.005 -0.021 0.459 1.000     
           
5.Exiting firm's brokerage 0.651 0.304 0.033 -0.028 0.187 0.280 1.000    
           
6.Gender 0.144 0.351 -0.011 -0.011 0.098 0.054 0.027 1.000   
           
7.Current firm performance 0.051 0.092 -0.034 -0.014 0.109 0.104 0.089 0.019 1.000  
           
8.Current industry median 
ROA 
0.046 0.048 -0.008 -0.009 -0.032 0.048 0.076 0.009 0.554 1.000 
           
9.Current firm size 2.184 1.376 0.049 -0.033 0.546 0.537 0.209 0.089 0.179 0.145 
           
10.Current firm slack 0.088 1.449 0.021 0.077 0.122 0.293 0.084 0.009 0.118 0.047 
           
11.Current firm R&D intensity 0.037 0.146 0.028 -0.012 -0.036 -0.014 -0.033 -0.008 -0.136 0.064 
           
12.Total independent directors 
in the current company 
7.905 2.322 0.007 0.372 0.661 0.373 0.165 0.082 -0.020 -0.108 





TABLE 4. (Continued) 
 Mean Std. Dev. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
13.Total female directors in 
the current company 
1.516 1.086 0.021 0.033 0.457 0.327 0.152 0.281 0.047 -0.002 
           
14.Total board appointments 
of all current companies 
13.549 4.793 0.022 0.214 0.806 0.653 0.292 0.086 0.067 -0.018 
           
15.CEO compensation of the 
current firms 
8.401 1.005 0.015 0.017 0.363 0.331 0.133 0.056 0.096 0.039 
           
16.CEO tenure of the current 
firms 
7.871 7.237 -0.033 -0.029 -0.153 -0.074 -0.036 -0.034 0.010 -0.006 
           
17.Director age 62.780 10.843 0.058 -0.003 0.027 0.035 0.020 -0.117 -0.004 -0.026 
           











TABLE 4. (Continued) 
 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
9.Current firm size 1.000          
           
10.Current firm slack 0.190 1.000         
           
11.Current firm R&D intensity -0.070 0.174 1.000        
           
12.Total independent directors in the 
current company 
0.351 0.085 -0.069 1.000       
           
13.Total female directors in the current 
company 
0.380 0.068 -0.053 0.510 1.000      
           
14.Total board appointments of all 
current companies 
0.571 0.164 -0.054 0.774 0.514 1.000     
           
15.CEO compensation of the current 
firms 
0.447 0.059 0.007 0.308 0.270 0.428 1.000    
           
16.CEO tenure of the current firms -0.092 0.011 0.013 -0.138 -0.123 -0.137 -0.095 1.000   
           
17.Director age 0.014 0.013 -0.011 0.021 -0.038 0.018 0.002 0.071 1.000  
           








TABLE 5. Multi-Failure Event History Analysis Results of Study 2 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Current industry median ROA -0.032 0.166 0.695** 0.508 3.451*** 3.537*** 
 (0.205) (0.236) (0.310) (0.310) (1.079) (1.073) 
 [0.875] [0.481] [0.025] [0.101] [0.001] [0.001] 
       
Current firm size 0.070*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.026*** 0.029 0.029 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.040) (0.040) 
 [0.000] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.471] [0.467] 
       
Current firm slack 0.010 0.014** 0.018*** 0.016** -0.023 -0.025 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.025) (0.026) 
 [0.112] [0.029] [0.006] [0.017] [0.373] [0.321] 
       
Current firm R&D intensity 0.357*** 0.268*** 0.206** 0.195** 0.718** 0.685** 
 (0.090) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.355) (0.341) 
 [0.000] [0.002] [0.017] [0.023] [0.043] [0.044] 
       
Total independent directors in the current company 
-
0.019*** 
-0.028*** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.073* -0.072* 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.039) (0.039) 
 [0.008] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.057] [0.067] 
       
Total female directors in the current company -0.017 -0.014 -0.007 -0.007 -0.064 -0.062 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.061) (0.061) 
 [0.123] [0.199] [0.565] [0.548] [0.294] [0.310] 
       
Total board appointments of the current company 0.011*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.032*** -0.059*** -0.061*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.021) (0.022) 




TABLE 5. (Continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
       
CEO compensation of the current firms -0.038*** -0.029*** -0.026** -0.027** -0.144** -0.139** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.058) (0.058) 
 [0.000] [0.008] [0.017] [0.014] [0.013] [0.017] 
       
CEO tenure of the current firms -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) 
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.003] [0.002] [0.773] [0.713] 
       
Director age 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.008 0.008 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.196] [0.243] 
       
Director tenure 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** -0.016** -0.016** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.034] [0.038] 
       
Director's centrality  0.605 0.613 -1.914 -26.553 -23.799 
  (1.291) (1.291) (3.141) (17.321) (52.968) 
  [0.639] [0.635] [0.542] [0.125] [0.653] 
       
Director's brokerage  2.289*** 2.389*** 2.296*** 15.314*** 15.469*** 
  (0.116) (0.119) (0.123) (0.671) (0.657) 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
       
Gender   -0.074*** -0.081** -0.139 -0.141 
   (0.028) (0.032) (0.114) (0.114) 




TABLE 5. (Continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Current firm performance   -0.497*** -0.247* 0.461 0.435 
   (0.115) (0.140) (0.625) (0.601) 
   [0.000] [0.077] [0.460] [0.469] 
       
Gender *Director's centrality    2.031   
    (5.805)   
    [0.726]   
       
Gender *Director's brokerage    0.089   
    (0.228)   
    [0.698]   
       
Current firm performance *Director's centrality    -89.388   
    (100.244)   
    [0.373]   
       
Current firm performance *Director's brokerage    2.551***   
    (0.615)   
    [0.000]   
       
Exiting firm's centrality     -0.021 -0.127 
     (0.018) (0.084) 
     [0.251] [0.132] 
       
Exiting firm's brokerage     -0.220 -0.643* 
     (0.241) (0.336) 
     [0.361] [0.055] 




TABLE 5. (Continued) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Exiting firm's centrality*Director's centrality      6.701 
      (24.655) 
      [0.786] 
       
Exiting firm's centrality*Director's brokerage      0.431 
      (0.317) 
      [0.174] 
       
Exiting firm's brokerage*Director's centrality      -4.830 
      (109.206) 
      [0.965] 
       
Exiting firm's brokerage*Director's brokerage      3.864** 
      (1.903) 
      [0.042] 
       
Observations 54,292 54,292 54,292 54,292 9,303 9,303 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 













TABLE 6. Hypotheses Testing Results of Study 2 
Hypothesis Proposed effect Empirical Results 
H1 
A director’s network brokerage is positively associated with the likelihood of director 
exit 
Supported 
   
H2 A director’s centrality is positively associate with the likelihood of director exit Not significant 
   
H3 Being female negatively moderates the relationship in H1 Not significant 
   
H4 Being female negatively moderates the relationship in H2 Not significant 
   
H5 A director’s current firm performance positively moderates the relationship in H1 Supported 
   
H6 A director’s current firm performance positively moderates the relationship in H2 Not significant 
   
H7 
The network centrality of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates the 
relationship in H1 
Not significant 
   
H8 
The network centrality of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates the 
relationship in H2 
Not significant 
   
H9 
The network brokerage of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates the 
relationship in H1 
Positive and 
significant 
   
H10 
The network brokerage of an individual’s current firm negatively moderates the 





TABLE 7. SIENA Network Analysis of Indirect Tie Dissolution (Study 3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Rate parameters:    
Rate parameter period 1 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
    
Rate parameter period 2 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.186*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
Other parameters:    
ROA 0.063 0.062 0.104 
 (1.647) (1.532) (1.617) 
    
Firm size 0.024 0.023 0.024 
 (0.061) (0.063) (0.059) 
    
Firm centrality 0.506 0.521 0.516 
 (1.649) (1.625) (1.555) 
    
Duality –0.105 –0.107 –0.101 
 (0.169) (0.174) (0.170) 
    
Director age –0.110*** –0.110*** –0.109*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
    
Director gender –0.369 –0.355 –0.381 
 (0.366) (0.350) (0.366) 
    
Director’s existing ties –0.110 –0.089 –0.145 
 (0.635) (0.588) (0.670) 
    
Indirect tie dissolution  –0.259 –0.545 
  (1.198) (1.555) 
Interaction terms:    
Director’s existing ties*indirect tie dissolution   2.557 
   (3.233) 
    
Director’s gender* indirect tie dissolution   1.496 
   (2.653) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 







TABLE 8. SIENA Network Analysis of Network Outsider Ratio (Study 3) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Rate parameters:    
Rate parameter period 1 0.634*** 0.988*** 0.987*** 
 (0.036) (0.065) (0.063) 
    
Rate parameter period 2 0.664*** 1.055*** 1.054*** 
 (0.037) (0.063) (0.062) 
Other parameters:    
ROA –2.247** –2.574** –2.639** 
 (1.044) (0.979) (0.993) 
    
Firm size –0.007 –0.093** –0.094** 
 (0.041) (0.036) (0.037) 
    
Firm centrality 0.030 –3.105*** –2.968*** 
 (1.206) (0.948) (0.973) 
    
Duality –0.224 –0.394*** –0.393*** 
 (0.111) ** (0.100) (0.103) 
    
Director age –0.064*** –0.026*** –0.026*** 
 (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) 
    
Director gender 0.823*** 0.368** 0.874** 
 (0.241) (0.144) (0.306) 
    
Director’s existing ties 1.077*** 0.377 -2.574 
 (0.267) (0.199) ** (4.904) 
    
Network outsider ratio  –4.700*** –4.760*** 
  (0.117) (0.150) 
Interaction terms:    
Director’s existing ties*Network outsider ratio   –3.111 
   (5.125) 
    
Director’s gender* Network outsider ratio   0.669** 
   (0.337) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





TABLE 9. Hypotheses Testing Results of Study 3 
Hypothesis Proposed effect Empirical Results 
H1 
After exiting a board, a focal director is more likely to join a board that has at 
least one director from the focal director’s prior board which he or she has just 
left. 
Not significant 
   
H2 
After exiting a board, a focal director is more likely to join a board that has 
more directors who are outsiders to the focal director’s network. 
Negative and significant 
   
H3a 
The number of existing ties between the focal director and directors of his or her 
prior board will negatively affect H1 
Not significant 
   
H3b 
The number of existing ties between the focal director and directors of his or her 
prior board will positively affect H2. 
Not significant 
   
H4 Being female will positively affect H1 Not significant 
   
H5 Being female will negatively affect H2 Positive and significant 
   
 
